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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal challenging an Order of Restitution granted to
Appellee, Federal National Mortgage Association, (FNMA), following an "immediate
occupancy hearing" held by the trial court in the course of FNMA's unlawful detainer action
against Appellant, Lorraine Sundquist, who challenged FNMA's standing by challenging its
claim of ownership of her Home by means of a trustee's deed from ReconTrust Company.
Sundquist argued below that FNMA lacks standing since any purported title derived
from ReconTrust is null and void because ReconTrust is not statutorily qualified under Utah's
non-judicial foreclosure statutes to conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales, and therefore was
not statutorily qualified to convey a trustee's deed to FNMA.
The "immediate occupancy hearing" was an interim hearing purportedly held
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-810(2), and the Order of Restitution is therefore an
interim order, although it mistakenly represents that "judgment" was issued, which was not
accurate given the definition of "judgment" set forth in Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. This interlocutory appeal is permitted pursuant by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.
Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust?
A.
Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted
"unauthorized"?

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.
Does an "unauthorized sale'5 conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured?

C.
Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to
dispossess Sundquist from her Home?
II.
Did the trial court err in granting possession without first whether it had subject
matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess Sundquist

Standard of Review: Each of the forgoing issues involve the interpretation of a statute, and
"[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law that the Court shall review for
correctness," ,4SC Utah, Inc. v WolfMountain Resorts, L.C. 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184, f 11,
giving no deference to the trial court's legal rulings.
The question of whether FNMA has standing to assert any right to occupancy is also a
legal question, to which this court gives no deference.1 See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994). There are no factual issues for the Court to review.

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms.
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as
the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed as security for
the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 57-1-20 through
57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of
1

This is particularly true in this case where Judge Kouris did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law
regarding the legal arguments made at the hearing regarding the lack of standing, but summarily denied the
motion to "stay the eviction" (which was not even the motion before the court), and where Judge Lubeck
subsequently summarily signed the Order of Restitution, also without making any findings of fact or conclusions
of law.

2
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an obligation of the trustor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed,
or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust deed.

Utah Code Annotated §57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the
state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to:
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the
obligation secured by the trust deed;
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust
deed and by law;
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the
property secured by the trust deed;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of Utah
or the United States;
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that:
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31 A, Insurance Code, to
conduct insurance business in the state;
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm
Credit Administration or its successor.
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide office within
the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state:
(i) that is open to the public;
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person:
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds.
(c) This Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to
May 14, 1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that trust deed.
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 209, to this Subsection (1) apply
only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi).
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the
trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv).
3
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(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to
create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under
the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified
successor trustee under Section 57-1-22.
(Emphasis added to highlight the qualifications of foreclosing trustees, as compared to other
trustees which may be appointed but which lack legislative permission to conduct sales)
Utah Code Annotated §57-l-22(l)(b) Successor trustees — Appointment by beneficiary —
Effect — Substitution of trustee — Recording — Form.
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and title of the
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee.
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-23 Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — Foreclosure
of trust deed.
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-2l(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold
in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the
beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the
trustee without express provision for it in the trust deed, (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-23.5 Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises
power of sale
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee
under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv).
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an
unauthorized person.
(2) (a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to
the trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the
unauthorized sale or $2,000, whichever is greater.
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing
plaintiff the plaintiffs costs and attorney fees.

Utah Code Annotated §57-1-24 Sale of trust property by trustee - Notice of default.
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until: (1) the trustee first files for record ....
(emphasis added)

4
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Utah Code Annotated §57-1-28(3) Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser — Recitals — Effect.
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of
redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and
the trustor's successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under
them, in and to the property sold, including all right, title, interest, and claim in and to
the property acquired by the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to
the execution of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall be considered effective and
relate back to the time of the sale.
Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-802.5. Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale.
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful detainer if
the person:
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being
served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-809.2. Proof required of plaintiff- Defense.
(2) In defense, the defendant may show that he or his ancestors, or those whose
interest in the premises he claims, had been in the quiet possession of the property for
the space of one entire year continuously before the commencement of the
proceedings, and that his interest is not ended or determined, and that this showing is a
bar to the proceedings.
Utah Code Annotated §78B-6-810.2. Court procedures.
(2) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment of rent or
for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in Subsection 78B-6802.5, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon request of either party, within
10 days after the day on which the defendant files the defendant's answer.
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a):
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the litigation's
pendency; and
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be adjudicated
without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and enter judgment
on the merits.

5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal challenging an Order of Restitution issued to FNMA,
after an "eviction hearing" held by the trial court sua sponte without any request of either
party, whereat the issue of whether FNMA has the uright to occupancy during the litigation's

" Although not directly affecting the outcome of this appeal, it is disturbing to note that many court clerks are
automatically scheduling "eviction hearings" or "immediate occupancy hearings" sua sponte when a defendant
files an answer, purportedly under UCA 78B-6-801(2), even though such hearings according to the legislature
are only to be conducted "upon request of either party," and, under the system put in place by the legislature, the
failure to request an 810(2) hearing in time for it to be heard within ten days of the filing of the answer would
constitute a waiver of the 810(2) hearing, and would required a plaintiff to then post a possession bond to protect
the defendant if plaintiff wishes to obtain possession of the property before the entry of final judgment. See
Section 57-1-808(1). This sua sponte conduct by court clerks is altering the unlawful detainer system put in
place by the legislature, to the detriment of defendants that would otherwise be protected by a possession bond,
or have the opportunity to post their own counter-possession bond (which they may only do under the statute if
the plaintiff first posts its possession bond). See Section 78b-6-808(4). It also amounts to a violation of the
ruling in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983) that the court should not reach out and take action on
behalf of one party that the party has not taken for itself, since in doing so the court clerk abandons its position of
neutrality and becomes an advocate for one side over the other, and actively aids one side over the other. In this
case it is even more egregious since it is the court clerk effectively making the request on behalf of the plaintiff
in order to preserve the plaintiffs interests to the detriment of the defendants, and not a judge. It certainly adds
to the already overwhelming perception that a debtor cannot get a fair break in our current court system where
their issues are not taken seriously simply because they are in default.
Had the court clerk not scheduled a hearing sua sponte in this case, and had FNMA not requested a
hearing in time for it to be heard within ten days after the filing of Sundquist's answer, then an 810(2) hearing
would have been waived and Sundquist would either still be in her home, or she would have the protection of a
possession bond to cover her damages and attorney fees resulting from an unlawful eviction, such as this. Others
similarly situated to Sundquist, who are being unlawfully evicted based on invalid ReconTrust trustee's deeds,
deserve the protection intended by the legislature that a possession bond would provide, and therefore the
improper sua sponte scheduling of hearings by court clerks must stop.
Furthermore, this practice is resulting in judges who are not assigned to the case nevertheless hearing
and deciding rights to occupancy during the litigation's pendency when the court will not be overseeing the
litigation, and therefore may not be paying adequate attention to the issues being raised in such hearings because
the cases are not their own. This practice of substitute judges filling in tends to result in less than diligent
attention to the arguments and issues, as occurred in this case when Judge Kouris mistakenly thought there was a
motion "to stay eviction." It appears from the transcript that the trial court was not familiar with the case and
was perhaps more interested in just getting through the hearing rather than seriously considering substantive
legal issues that could and would affect the rest of the case, and entering proper findings of fact and conclusions
of law as required by Rule 52 when evidentiary hearings are held, which is what 810(2) hearings are supposed to
be, but seldom are. This amounts to a denial of due process since defendants routinely are not given an adequate
opportunity to defend themselves or present their issues as they are rushed through the meat grinder that our
court system has become for debtors who are being unlawfully evicted from their own homes.
Since it has only been since 2009, when Subsection 78B-6-810(2) was amended to first allow such
hearings in the case of holdovers after a forced sale, this detrimental practice is a fairly recent development. It is
requested that the Court note the impropriety of the practice of sua sponte scheduling of 810(2) hearings that
have not been requested by one of the parties and direct that it stop since the issue will likely not otherwise come
before this Court directly.

6
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pendency" under U.C.A. §78B-6-810(2) was decided based on FNMA's claim that it had the
right to occupancy based upon a purported title it claimed to have acquired by means of a
trustee's deed from ReconTrust.
Sundquist at the hearing challenged FNMA's standing to seek any "right of
occupancy" based on the purported ReconTrust title because ReconTrust is not a qualified
foreclosing trustee under U.C.A. §57-1-21 and U.C.A. § 57-1-23, which explicitly require that
a foreclosing trustee be either an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah, or a title insurance
company or agency, maintaining a bona fide office within the state.
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is neither, and therefore ReconTrust is an
"unauthorized person" to execute the statutory "power of sale" created in UCA §57-1-23, and
that any sale conducted by ReconTrust is an "unauthorized sale," as those terms were recently
defined by the Utah Legislature. As such, any purported sale by ReconTrust is null and void
ab initio, and could not have conveyed any title to FNMA so as to give it any ownership of
the Home.
Absent any ownership of the Home, FNMA obviously lacks any standing to even
bring an unlawful detainer action, or more particularly to assert any "right of occupancy" at a
Section 810(2) hearing.
At the hearing, Judge Kouris ignored the challenge to FNMA's standing and the
legislative requirements of U.C.A. §57-1-21, U.C.A. §57-1-23 and U.C.A. §57-1-24. Instead,
it appears, given the nature of his questioning, that he based his unexplained ruling solely on
the simple fact that Sundquist was in "default" on her loan. No finding of fact or conclusion
of law was ever made by Judge Kouris that FNMA in fact or law actually owned the Home or
had standing to seek occupancy, despite the legal challenge to FNMA's title and standing

7
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having been directly raised - and even though it is clear as a matter of law that ReconTrust is
an "unauthorized person" who conducted an "unauthorized sale," as expressly prohibited by
the Utah Legislature, and therefore could not have possibly conveyed title to FNMA.
Judge Lubeck subsequently signed an Order of Restitution ordering that that Sundquist
vacate her home, again without any findings of fact or conclusion of law to support the Order.
Sundquist sought an interlocutory appeal of the Order of Restitution and it was granted
for this Court to determine whether FNMA has standing to evict Sundquist from her own
Home.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Defendant Loraine Sundquist has been a resident of her home on 1599 East 12700
South, Draper, Utah since 1996. (R P33). (Hereafter, the "Home")
On or about 2006 Sundquist contacted American Elite Mortgage to obtain a new
"mortgage" on her Home and she entered into a loan secured by a trust deed on her Home. (R
P33-34).
On January 2011, a NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE was posted on Sundquist's door
at the direction of ReconTrust, for the purpose of foreclosing the trust deed. (R P37).
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not an attorney authorized to practice law in the
State of Utah, and does not maintain an office within the State. (R. P38)
It is also undisputed that ReconTrust is not a title insurance company or agency
licensed in Utah, and does not maintain a bona fide office within the state as required by
statute. (R. P38)

8
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On May 17, 2011, at or about 10:30 am, ReconTrust, purportedly held a non-judicial
foreclosure sale, at which time it is unclear who supposedly made a credit bid, (and whether
that bid was valid3) to become the supposed owner of Sundquist's Home. (R. P37)
ReconTrust reportedly delivered a trustee's deed to FNMA purporting to convey title
to FNMA on or about May 25, 2011. (R. P7) (See Addendum)
On or about June 1, 2011, a Notice to Quit was posted on Sundquist's Home by
plaintiffs counsel, claiming that FNMA now owns the Home because it bought it at the
foreclosure sale. (R. PP48-49)
Because Sundquist wanted to fight for her home aginst the unlawful foreclosure that
had taken place, she remained in her home and a Complaint was filed by FNMA against
Sundquist on June 13,2011, claiming that it owns the Home by means of the trustee's deed
from ReconTrust and requesting the Court order Sundquist to vacate her Home. (R.PP1-15).
On June 22, 2011, Sundquist filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R.P28-32).
A court clerk, upon receipt of Sundquist's Answer and Counterclaim, scheduled an
"Eviction Hearing" on June 27, 2011, sua sponte, without any request being made therefore
by either party as is required by UCA 78B-6-801 (2). (R.P26)

MERS purportedly assigned to BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, "all beneficial interest under that certain deed
of trust dated 05/02/2006, executed by; Loraine Sundquist, ... Together with the note or notes therein described
or referred to," on or about January 7, 2011, and recorded January 21, 2011 (even though there is no evidence
that MERS ever actually owned the note such that it could assign it - thereby breaking the chain of title)
(hereafter the "First Corporate Assignment,")- There is a second Corporation Assignment of Deed of
Trust/Mortgage, whereby BAC purportedly assigned "all beneficial interest under that certain deed of trust...
Together with the note or notes therein described or referred to" to FNMA, which assignment was dated May 18,
2011 (THE DAY AFTER THE PURPORTED FORECLOSURE SALE)(hereafter the "Second Corporate
Assignment"). The Trustee's Deed, also dated May 18, 2011, falsely asserts that FNMA had been the successful
bidder at the sale the day before, even though according to the First and Second Corporate Assignments FNMA
did not own any interest in the debt until the day after the sale. If that is the case, then FNMA could not have
legally done a credit bid on May 17th. FNMA's story is inconsistent with FNMA's story. It appears that unless
FNMA was committing a fraud by means of the First Assignment, FNMA did not own the debt on the date of
sale and therefore could not have made a credit bid, and therefore for a second reason FNMA lacks a valid
trustee's deed and correspondingly lacks standing to assert a right to occupancy.
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An Eviction Hearing Brief including all attachments was filed by Sundquist on June
24, 2011. (R.PP33-62) (See Addendum).
Following the hearing on June 27th, the Court ruled" I'm going to deny the motion at
this point to, to vacate the eviction and I will sign an order of restitution, when you have it
prepared," see Transcript pg 11, lines 2-4 (even though there was no "motion to vacate the
eviction") and he issued Minutes of the Eviction Hearing. Judge Lubeck signed an Order of
Restitution even though he had not heard the matter, and he did so without any findings of
fact or conclusions of law. (R.PP63) (See Addendum)
A Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with attachments was filed on
June 30, 2011. (R.PP64-88), and a Notice of Appeal was filed by Sundquist on June 30,
2011. (R.PP89-90). This Court stayed the Order of Restitution pending the interlocutory
appeal. (R. PI 13).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This is a very simple case if the Court follows the very simple and plain
language of the law that the legislature has established as to whom it has granted
statutory permission to conduct non-judicial foreclosures, and if it follows the
Supreme Court's admonition to the courts of this state to closely examine what
has happened in this case.
"The Supreme Court explained [in Blodgett v. Martsch] that courts have a
duty to closely examine trust deed foreclosures that are questioned because they
are far simpler than mortgage foreclosures, which require the assistance of the
10
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court." Five F, LLC v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373, paragraph 14,
81 p.3d 105. {CitingBlodgett v. Martsch, 590 p.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)).
I.
Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust?
Non-judicial foreclosure is a statutory remedy that may only be exercised in
accordance with the statutes that create it inasmuch as the statutes reflect the legislative policy
determinations as to how the statutory remedy it has created may be utilized.
The Legislature is free to decide to whom it will grant permission to exercise the
statutory "power of sale" it created, and indeed it has, by creating specific statutory
qualifications for any person/entity to act as a foreclosing trustee.
The Legislature is also free to declare that any person not so qualified is an
"unauthorized person," who lacks any grant of statutory authority to exercise the "power of
sale," and that any purported exercise of the "power of sale" by an "unauthorized person"
results in an "unauthorized sale," as it has expressly declared.
A.
Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted
"unauthorized"?
The Utah Legislature has determined in its legislative wisdom that the only persons to
whom it will grant the statutory "power of sale" are those who are either 1) an active member
of the Utah State Bar, or 2) title insurance companies or agencies licensed in the state.
No other group has been given the statutory "power of sale," as repeated by the
Legislature several times in the statute, and as clearly indicated by the Legislature's recent
enactment expressly defining any such unqualified person as an "unauthorized person" and
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any sale they perform as an "unauthorized sale," and has even provided civil penalties for any
"unauthorized person" who performs an "unauthorized sale."
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not qualified under the statute to be a foreclosing
trustee since it is neither an attorney nor a title insurance company or agency, and therefore it
lacks permission to exercise the statutory "power of sale" created in UCA 57-1-23 so as to
grant a trustee's deed.

B.
Does an "unauthorized sale" conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured?
Inasmuch as the only way to sell a property through a non-judicial foreclosure is for a
a duly-qualified person to exercise the statutory "power of sale" by granting a trustee's deed
to the purchaser, any purported trustee's deed granted by an "unauthorized" foreclosing
trustee is null and void ab initio.
Such a deed grants nothing. Therefore FNMA has no ownership interest.

C.
Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to
dispossess Sundquist from her Home?
Inasmuch as ReconTrust is an indisputably "unauthorized person" under the statute,
and has conducted an "unauthorized sale," the purported trustee's deed, under which FNMA
claims ownership of the Home, as a matter of law was null and void and therefore could not,
and did not, convey any title in the Home to FNMA.
As such, FNMA lacks standing to evict Sundquist from what is still her own Home.
Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award FNMA occupancy
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during the litigation's pendency, and therefore any order granting to FNMA any occupancy or
possession of the Home was equally null and void ab initio.
II.
Did the trial court err in granting possession without first determining whether it
had subject matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess
Sundquist

The trial court should have resolved the question of standing by resolving the question
of ownership before it ruled on the question of possession.
The same lack of standing, derived from the lack of any ownership interest in the
property at issue, that precludes standing to seek interim occupancy of Sundquist's Home,
naturally also results in a lack of standing to even bring the unlawful detainer action since the
unlawful detainer statute is only for "owners" to recover possession of their property.
Therefore not only must the Order of Restitution be stricken for a lack of standing,
FNMA's entire unlawful detainer action must necessarily be summarily denied on remand for
a lack of standing, and on remand Sundquist must necessarily be declared the prevailing party
on the unlawful detainer action.

ARGUMENT
I.
Does FNMA have standing to evict Sundquist from her Home under Utah's
unlawful detainer statutes, if FNMA's purported title to the property was received by
means of an invalid trustee's deed from ReconTrust?
Non-judicial foreclosures are not a remedy recognized in common law. Until the Utah
Legislature adopted its non-judicial foreclosure statutes in UCA §§ 57-1-19 to 36, nonjudicial foreclosures simply were not available in Utah.
The statutory "power of sale," whereby a foreclosing trustee may "cause the trust
property to be sold in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27" is only found in
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UCA § 57-1-23, and is a statutory power created and granted by the foreclosure statutes — and
by no other means.
Parties simply do not have the inherent right or power to come up with their own nonstatutory methods for conducting non-judicial foreclosures separate from the foreclosing
statutes. All parties must therefore follow the rules established by the Legislature if they want
to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure.
The Legislature is free to dictate who may be authorized to exercise the statutory
"power of sale" it created, and indeed it has, by creating specific qualifications for any
person/entity to act as a foreclosing trustee which it has done in Section 57-1-21. These
statutory qualifications have already withstood legal challenge and been declared to be
permissible by the Tenth Circuit in Shurtleffv. Kliensmith, 571 F.3r 1033 (12009).
The Legislature is also free to declare that any person not so qualified is an
"unauthorized person" who lacks any statutory authority to exercise the "power of sale," and
that any purported exercise of the "power of sale" by an "unauthorized person" results in an
"unauthorized sale," as it has expressly declared by enactment of
Senate Bill 261 just this year, which went into effect seven days before the purported
foreclosure in this case. See Section 57-1-23.5.
Senate Bill 261 is consistent with the previous limitations on who may conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure:
"The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold ..."
UCA 57-1-23
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"The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee
of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv)." UCA 571-21(3).
"A trustee with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to create a
lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under the trust deed
may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under
Section 57-1-22." UCA 57-1-21(4).
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-121(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until ..." UCA 57-1-24.
As the legislature has made perfectly clear by the forgoing provisions, it has only
granted the statutory "power of sale" to those who are qualified under Subsection 57-121(l)(a)(i)or(iv).
If this Court were to allow anyone one who was not qualified under Subsection 57-121(l)(a)(i) or (iv) to exercise the "power of sale," this Court would be impermissibly
rewriting the statute to remove the statutory qualifications and all of the forgoing unequivocal
declarations.
We therefore address ourselves to [the statutes'] meaning, keeping in mind one of the
cardinal rules of statutory constructions, viz., that the interpretation must be based on
the language used, and that the court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it
conform to an intention not expressed.
The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act read by itself, or in
connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject, is clear, certain and
unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law
according to its terms. If a legislative enactment violates no constitutional provision
or principle, it must be deemed its own sufficient and conclusive evidence of the
justice, propriety and policy of its passage."
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission etaL, 155 P.2d
184 (Utah
15
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A.
Was ReconTrust an "unauthorized person" when it conducted the foreclosure
sale at issue in this case, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale it conducted
"unauthorized"?
The Utah Legislature has determined in its legislative wisdom that the only persons
who may exercise the statutory "power of sale" are those who are either 1) an active member
of the Utah State Bar, maintaining a bona fide office in the State where trustors may meet
with the trustee, make payments, etc., or 2) title insurance companies or agencies licensed in
the state, maintaining a bona fide office in the State where trustors may meet with the trustee,
make payments, etc. See Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) and (l)(b).
When determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory and jurisdictional, 'the
most fundamental [guideline] is that the court should give effect to the intention of the
legislature.' Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1964).
Determining the intention of the legislature 'requires us to consider what the figurative
"legislative mind" would have intended had it adverted to the particular circumstances
we are confronted with for adjudication.' Id"
ASC Utah, Inc. v. WolfMountain Resorts, L.C, 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 1184, ]fl7.
The statutory qualifications to be a foreclosing trustee, (as compared to a mere
trustee),4 are clearly mandatory. No other person is granted the statutory permission to
exercise the statutory "power of sale." See UCA sections 57-1-21(3) and (4), 57-1-23, 57-123.5,57-1-24.
As the Legislature recently made its 'legislative mind" perfectly clear for one and all:
"As used in this section: (a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a
trustee under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv). (b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise
of a power of sale by an unauthorized person." UCA 57-1-23.5(1).

While there are six classes of persons/entities which may serve as a trustee under a trust deed, only two of those
classes are granted the statutory authority to serve as foreclosing trustees with the authority to exercise the
"power of sale." If any of the other classes are serving as trustee, they must be substituted out by the statutory
beneficiary if the statutory beneficiary wishes to foreclose. See UCA 57-1-21(4).
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It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not an attorney, and is not a title insurance
company or agency. It is a subdivision of Bank of America, NA.
If the legislature were to consider the undisputed facts before this Court, as supposed
by ASC, it would unequivocally declare that ReconTrust is not "qualified" under the statute to
be a foreclosing trustee, and therefore it has not been granted the statutory "power of sale"
created in UCA 57-1-23 so as to allow it to convey title to FNMA by means of a trustee's
deed under Section 57-1-28(3). Indeed, the motivation behind Senate Bill 261 was to stop
ReconTrust from continuing to illegally foreclose on homes in Utah by clarifying that what it
was doing was illegal and providing a financial incentive for private counsel to assist
homeowners in fighting ReconTrust's unlawful foreclosures.
Since it is undisputed that ReconTrust does not qualify under Subsection 57-121(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) for a grant of statutory authority to exercise the "power of sale," it is
undisputed that it was an "unauthorized person."
And since it is undisputed that ReconTrust as an "unauthorized person" exercised the
"power of sale" when it purportedly sold Sundquist's Home, it is necessarily undisputed that
it conducted an "unauthorized sale."
The Legislature could not have been any clearer that the sale at issue in this case was
not authorized under the non-judicial foreclosure statutes if this specific case were presented
to it today for another vote.

B.
Does an "unauthorized sale" conducted by an "unauthorized person" result in an
"unauthorized trustee's deed" such that the purported sale of the property is null and
void ab initio so that no transfer of any title to FNMA ever occured?
If a stranger without any authority walked into the Recorder's office and recorded a
Substitution of Trustee naming himself as the new successor trustee under the Court's own
17
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trust deed, and then recorded a notice of default and election to sell against the Court's home,
and then subsequently published a notice of sale after waiting the requisite 3 months, and then
conducted a sale proper in every respect, selling the property for cash, and finally even
delivered a trustee's deed to the buyer, with all the recitations as to compliance with the
procedural requirements, such that every step is perfectly performed in accordance with the
statutes, that buyer would still not own the Court's home. The trustee's deed would be
worthless - because the stranger had no authority to act as trustee. He is a mere interloper.
ReconTrust's lack of statutory authority to act as a foreclosing trustee renders any
trustee's deed it conveys equally worthless. Its acts are the acts of a mere interloper,
As the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted in both Bevilacqua and Ibanez: "[W]here
a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence of authority, 'there is no valid execution of the power
and the sale is wholly void.' 'One of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly
adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.' ... 'U.S. Bank's lack of authority
to foreclose at the time it purported to foreclose - is fatal to Bevilacqua's claim to own the
property.'" Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 2011 Mass. Lexis 918, pg 9, quoting U.S. Bank v
Ibanez at 941 N.E. 2d, 41 (see addendum).
Inasmuch as the only lawful way to sell a property through a non-judicial foreclosure
in Utah is for a duly-qualified trustee to exercise the statutory "power of sale" to grant a
trustee's deed to the purchaser, any purported trustee's deed granted by an "unauthorized"
foreclosing trustee is a nullity, and is void ab initio.
It is axiomatic that a deed grants nothing if the grantor has nothing to grant. See e.g.,
Holmes Development v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895 t (grantor did not validly convey the
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property because grantor never held title to the parcel because of erroneous quitclaim deed in
its chain of title that was supposed to convey title to grantor but did not.)
As an unqualified trustee, ReconTrust had no trustee's title to convey.
If the grantor has nothing to convey, then the deed is a nullity and void. It is of no
value, and anyone taking subsequent "title" in that same chain of title likewise acquires
nothing.
A similar question was recently decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 918 (decided October 18,
2011). (See Addendum)
In Bevilacqua, the plaintiff had received a quit claim deed for a property which had
been improperly foreclosed because the foreclosing bank conducted the foreclosure sale
before receiving assignment of the mortgage. He tried to bring a "try title" action to remove
the cloud on the title. The trial court dismissed the case due to a lack of standing that denied
the court subject matter jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed.
The plaintiff attempted to argue that "a single recorded deed purporting to transfer
title is sufficient to establish record title." Id at pg 8. The trial court had noted that such a
theory would allow someone to record title to the Brooklyn Bridge, commence suit and hope
for a default, and thereby become the owner of the Bridge. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court also naturally rejected the "single deed" theory:
for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that there is nothing magical
in the act of recording an instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise
meaningless document with legal effect. ... Recording is not sufficient in and of itself,
however to render an invalid document legally significant. ... As a result, it is the
effectiveness of a document that is controlling rather than its mere existence. ... The
effectiveness of the quitclaim deed to Bevilacqua thus turns in part on the validity of
his grantor's title.
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Id at pg 9 (citations omitted).
The plaintiff then tried to argue that there was a sufficient chain of deeds recorded at
the registry, but this argument was also rejected because of the invalid foreclosure deed in his
chain. As the Court noted: "where a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence of authority,
'there is no valid execution of the power and the sale is wholly void.' ... One of the terms
of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled to
foreclose.'" Id. quotingIbanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass 201 l)(emphasis added).
Similarly, in Utah, the Court of Appeals in Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246, 190
P.3d 23, f 19, held that the person who executed a quitclaim deed was "bound to follow" the
method for revoking the trust when a quitclaim deed was executed, and his failure to do so
required the setting aside of the quitclaim deed "as void ab initio." Because the prescribed
method was not followed, the purported deed was worthless.
Likewise in Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244, \ 5-6, the Court of
Appeals rejected the defendants' arguments that a notice of claim was properly filed against
the plaintiffs property and held that a lien placed upon the plaintiffs property was not
authorized by statute, and therefore the trial court was correct in declaring it "void ab initio."
"A thing is void which is done against the law at the very time of doing it,..." Ockey
v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, fii7. "In general, the difference between void and
voidable contracts is whether they offend public policy. ... [Contracts that offend public
policy or harm the public are void ab initio." Id at ^[19. "A contract is void ab inito if it
seriously offends law or public policy, in contrast to a contract that is merely voidable at the
election of one party to the contract." Id fill 1 (quoting Black's Law Disctionary 1604 (8
ed.2004)).
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The public policy as to whether a trustee that is not qualified under Section 57-121(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may convey a trustee's deed, a statutory remedy, has been unequivocally
established by the legislature: and the answer is no. Subsection 57-1-21(4) expressly provides
that the "power of sale" and the other trustee powers under a trust deed may only be exercised
"if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under Section 57-1-22."
Foreclosure sales by "unauthorized persons" are "unauthorized." See Section 57-123.5, and therefore are against public policy.
There is no doubt the ReconTrust trustee's deed at issue in this case was "against the
law" when it was made, and therefore it is void ab inito.
Being void ab initio, the ReconTrust trustee's deed to FNMA did not convey any
interest in the property to FNMA. FNMA therefore does not own any interest in Sundquist's
Home.

C.
Absent an "authorized sale" of Sundquist's Home to FNMA does FNMA have
standing to assert a "right of occupancy during the litigation's pendency" in order to
dispossess Sundquist from her Home?
FNMA lacks any ownership in the Home that would entitle it to have standing to
assert any right to occupancy under the unlawful detainer statute. Absent ownership, FNMA
obviously lacks standing under the unlawful detainer statues to evict Sundquist from what is
still legally her own Home.
The problem is that the trial court jumped the gun and awarded possession by issuing
the Order of Restitution5 before deciding whether FNMA actually owned the property, by
simply accepting that since FNMA claimed to own the property it must own the property. In

5

In should be noted that while the legislature has given sever instances where an Order of Restitution may be
awarded in an unlawful detainer action, it has not granted the trial court authority to issue an Order of Restitution
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other words, the trial court did not determine ownership by the third party appearing before it,
it merely assumed it.
As the Utah Supreme Court has observed, "the unlawful detainer statute applies only
in cases where an owner of property is unlawfully deprived of possession." Osguthorpe v.
WolfMountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, 232 P.3d 999124 (emphasis added).
The unlawful detainer statute defines "owner" as "the actual owner of the premises."
UCA 78B-6-801 (5). Consequently, the unlawful detainer statute may only be invoked by
"actual owners" of the property, not merely plaintiffs who claim to be owners.
When ownership is contested, until the question of whether a plaintiff "actually owns"
the property at issue is heard and finally resolved, the plaintiff does not have standing to seek
the remedies afforded under the unlawful detainer statute.
A trial court cannot grant occupancy during the litigation's pendency, as allowed
under Section 87B-6-801(2), if "ownership" is in dispute because if "ownership" is still in
dispute the plaintiff cannot possibly prove a "right of occupancy" at that time because
ownership is yet to be decided.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Osguthorpe, "The unlawful detainer statute is not
the appropriate vehicle for litigating disputes over non-possessory interests in property, such
as disputes over the scope of a license or easement." Osguthorpe at ^ 24.
Sundquist asserts that an unlawful detainer action is also not the appropriate
mechanism to litigate disputes as to ownership.
If "ownership" is contested at the time of an "immediate occupancy hearing," then
standing, and a "right" to occupancy, cannot be finally established by the plaintiff who has the
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burden to establish its "right" to possession in spite of any challenge since it is plaintiff that is
asking the court to change the status quo.
If ownership is contested, the court cannot proceed to take any action under Section
810(2) to deprive an owner of his or her home in only ten days after he or she files an answer,
often after having only three days to answer after being served a copy of the complaint, and
before any discovery has been done, even before any initial disclosures have been delivered
revealing the basis for plaintiffs claim to ownership, etc., without denying the defendant his
or her due process.
Since plaintiffs in unlawful detainer actions following a forced sale are often strangers
to the original transactions, and since there typically is absolutely no public record to show
that the plaintiff was in fact the statutory beneficiary as defined by Section 57-1-19(1) ("the
person for whose benefit a trust deed is given" and the successive owners of the debt), trial
courts actually rarely have any proof at all before them at an "immediate occupancy hearing"
that the foreclosure being asserted was in fact lawfully initiated by the true statutory
beneficiary. (In fact, given the rampant use of loan servicers, who do not own the debt and
therefore are not the statutory beneficiaries, to initiate foreclosures in violation of the plain
language mandate by the legislature that statutory beneficiaries must "execute and
acknowledge" substitutions of trustee in order to ensure that the foreclosure is being pursued
by the proper party, the true identity of the statutory beneficiary, or "investor" as the term is
often used in the industry, is frequently never even discovered.6) Trial courts are merely
assuming that the foreclosures are valid, even when they are challenged, and are summarily
evicting people based on that assumption before the question of ownership is decided.

6

It's not uncommon for loan servicers to refuse to tell a home owner who the actual "investor" or true owner of
their debt is.

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This is hardly due process, and the systematic mass denial of due process that is
currently occurring in the Utah judicial system needs to be halted by reinforcing that even
debtors have rights, including the right to be heard after a reasonable opportunity to prepare
their case, not 13 days, or fewer, after being served a complaint.
And in the case of unlawful detainers, they have the statutory right of possession until
"actual ownership" is finally proven, because until "actual ownership" is established (versus
merely alleged in a complaint) the trial court cannot logically find a "right to occupancy"
during the litigation's pendency. Obviously only the "actual owner" can claim a right to
occupancy during the pendency of litigation of other matters unrelated to ownership and the
right of possession.
Otherwise, people will be denied possession of their homes with no meaningful
remedy if they ultimately prevail on their defenses or counterclaims challenging the
lawfulness of the foreclosure since the courts cannot put them back in their homes
retroactively at the end of the case.7
Indeed the sad reality is that many with legitimate challenges to unlawful foreclosures,
such as those homeowners evicted based upon invalid trustee's deeds unlawfully issued by
ReconTrust, give up once they are evicted from their homes because they cannot afford to
keep fighting.
Whereas if the defendants due process rights were being honored, even if they are in
default, and the statute were actually followed, and their claims and challenges to the
7

Transferring possession prior to a final ruling on the question of ownership also carries the risk that the plaintiff
may view the interim ruling as the green light to sell the property before the end of the case, in which case the
defendants may never get their property back.
8
One of the sad realities is that many "defaults" are induced by the loan servicers telling homeowners seeking a
loan modification that they cannot even be considered for a modification unless they default for at least two
months, with the representation that those missed payments can be placed at the end of the loan. Then the
homeowners are often put on trial payments that are reduced, which further increases the amount of the default,
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plaintiffs claims to ownership were being heard before they are evicted, they could remain in
their homes, as anticipated and allowed by the legislature,9 until the question of ownership,
and the corresponding question of possession, are heard and finally resolved.

II.
Did the trial court err in granting possession without first determining whether it
had subject matter jurisdiction given the challenge to FNMA's standing to dispossess
Sundquist
The present practice of the trial courts to merely assume ownership for purposes of an
immediate occupancy hearing is inconsistent with the approach discussed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Bichler v. DEI Systems, Inc., 2009 UT 63, 220 P.3d 1203, where the Court
addressed the interplay between unlawful detainer claims and counterclaims or defenses that
affect the right to possession being claimed under the unlawful detainer statute.
The Supreme Court noted that counterclaims are perfectly acceptable in unlawful
detainer cases and recognized that some defenses and counterclaims may "directly relate to
the issue of possession," id. at % 29, and that such counterclaims must be resolved before a
final determination of possession may be made, and that final determinations of possession
should be made in accordance with Rule 54(b) which requires all related claims and
counterclaims involving the question of possession to be resolved before a "final judgment"
on the issue of possession can be entered.
Recognizing the important public policy of providing a speedy resolution of
the issue of possession, we hold that in an unlawful detainer action with multiple
during which time the loan servicer diverts funds that are paid, and would otherwise be going to the owner of the
debt, to itself as late fees etc., thereby increasing the "default" even more. All while the homeowner thinks they
are doing the right thing until suddenly they are denied a loan modification, even after paying all of the trial
payments, leaving them thousands and thousands of dollars in default with no prospect to recover.
9
The legislature has already provided the mechanism whereby a plaintiff may obtain possession of the premises
prior to the final determination of ownership, and that is by posting a possession bond under Section 808. That
is the legislative remedy, but trial courts across the state are ignoring the legislative scheme and creating their
own on the mistaken assumption they can hold an immediate occupancy hearing at any time, even though the
legislature expressly limits such hearings to ten days after the filing of an answer, and turn over possession to the
plaintiffs without a possession bond. Thereby adding insult to injury.
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claims or counterclaims, a rule 54(b) entry of a final judgment resolving the issues of
possession is proper when it includes all claims and counterclaims necessary to
determine the lawful lawful possession of the property.
Before directing the entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) on the issue of
possession, the court must resolve all claims relating to possession. Our prior case law
indicates that a counterclaim raising a breach of warranty of habitability must be
addressed in determining lawful possession. Similarly, a claim of wrongful or
retaliatory eviction would go to the issue of lawful possession.
Id. at 1(30 and 32 (citations omitted).10
Obviously the question of ownership of the property directly relates to the question of
possession. Therefore, given the Supreme Court's holding in Bichler, the trial court must
resolve all questions relating to ownership before it can rule on the right to the possession of
the property.
When the Supreme Court's ruling in Bichler is considered in light of the Court's
observation that unlawful detainer actions are only for "owners," which the statute defines as
actual owners, a plaintiff does not have standing to seek occupancy under Section 810(2) if
ownership is disputed, such as when the legality of the foreclosure is disputed, as in this case.
u

[I]n Utah, ... standing is a jurisdictional requirement." A challenge to a
party's standing "raise[es] fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority
over the dispute." As such, a challenge to standing is generally directed at a plaintiff
and questions whether the plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirement to air a
particular grievance in court.
Osguthorpe, 2010 UT 29, ]f 14 (citations omitted).
FNMA's lack of standing to assert a right to occupancy is a subject matter jurisdiction
defect. Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award FNMA

10

The Supreme Court then considered DEI's claim for an offset for damages it suffered under the alleged
counterclaims unrelated to the lease, and even acknowledged that such claims for financial offsets could require
resolution before the resolution of the issue of possession since such offsets could possibly be applied to rents
such that a default might not even exist, which would preclude a claim for possession.
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possession or occupancy under any theory, and therefore any order granting to FNMA any
occupancy or possession of the Home was equally null and void ab initio.
Once the issue of standing was raised, and the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction
to hear and grant an unlawful detainer action was thereby challenged, the trial court should
have resolved the question of its jurisdiction to even entertain the unlawful detainer action by
resolving the question of ownership before proceeding any further with the unlawful detainer
action's Section 810(2) hearing.
"If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void. Therefore the initial
inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the requested action is
within its jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the
authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah
App. 1989)(citing Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)(emphasis
added))
U

A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to have the power and authority to

decide a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot proceed. See
Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 n.3 (Utah App. 1990)." Burns Chiropractic Clinic v.
Allstate, 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993)(emphasis added).
"Because it is a threshold issue, we address jurisdictional questions before resolving
other claims." Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, f 11
(Utah 2002)(emphasis added).
[SJubject matter jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain an
action. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any
time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor
the court can do anything to fill that void.
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Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis added), see also Thompson v.
Jackson, 1A3 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)("subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
created or conferred on the court by consent or waiver")(citing Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc. 694
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); State Dept. Social Servs. V. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982); Basso
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1974)).
"[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to
the one against whom it runs." State, v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)(vacating a
"default" judgment based upon a Rule 60(b) motion).
"Subject Matter Jurisdiction is the authority and the competency of the court to decide
the case. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is the court's ability to exercise its power
over a person for the purposes of adjudicating his or her rights and liabilities. A lack of either
is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant." Fiji I at
1132 (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court lacked the competency to decide the right to occupancy
because ownership is disputed.
The general rule in effect for many years as explained by United States
Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods in United States v. Walker, 109 U.S.
258, 3 S. Ct. 277, 27 L. Ed. 927 (1883). is this, "Although a court may have
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, yet if it makes a decree
which is not within the powers granted to it by the law of its organization its
decree is void." Id. at 266. And again in Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 254 U.S. 348. 41 S. Ct 116, 65 L. Ed. 297 (1920), writing for the Court,
Justice Joseph McKenna recognized, "Courts are constituted by authority and
they cannot go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that
authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even
prior to reversal." Id. at 353-354.
In re Andrews, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3333 (N.D.Bank. AL 2007)(unpublished)(citing
Stockyards Nat. Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, 245 P. 966, 973 (Utah 1925)).
It is a familiar doctrine that though a court may have jurisdiction of subjectmatter and of person and thus power to hear and determine, still in a cause may
act, or make an order, or render judgment, beyond or in excess of jurisdiction do something which it had no power to do. ... A fact apparent from the
28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mandatory record, showing that fundamental law was disregarded in the
establishment of the judgment will render it null and voidfor all purposes.
Stockyards Nat. Bank of So. Omaha v. Bragg, 245 P. 966, 973 (Utah 1925)(emphasis added).
Consequently, once the question of ownership arose, the trial court necessarily should
have terminated the Section 810(2) hearing, and reserved the question of possession until after
the court could fully hear and decide the question of ownership in accordance with Bichler.
Only if the court finally concluded that the plaintiff is the "actual owner" of the property
could it then proceed with the unlawful detainer action so as to rule upon possession, and
enter a Rule 54(b) final judgment as to who is entitled to possession during the remainder of
the litigation.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
If the court concludes that FNMA lacks ownership of the Home as argued, then the
unlawful detainer action is substantively concluded, and Sundquist is the prevailing party.
Sundquist is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorneys' fees in this case inasmuch as she
is .
Sundquist respectfully requests that this honorable court award the reasonable costs
and attorneys fees incurred as a private attorney general in bringing this interlocutory appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission,
recognized a party's right to recover attorneys' fees as a private attorney general when the
"vindication of a strong or societally important public policy" takes place and the necessary
costs in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring
subsidization." Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com % 855 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994) citing
with approval Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 (1977).
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In the instant matter, Sundquist has challenged a violation of Utah's non-judicial
foreclosure statutes with broad public policy and societal implications. Utah's Attorney
General previously opined in favor of the Sundquist's position, but Sundquist is bearing the
burden of enforcing the law not just for herself, but for all similarly situated victims of
ReconTrust's misconduct, which FNMA has been the knowing beneficiary thereof.
Accordingly, in light of the broad impact an award a favorable ruling will have upon the
foreclosure crisis in the State of Utah, Appellant's effort should be subsidized with an award
of attorneys' fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
Sundquist respectfully requests that the Court rule that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed
was null and void ab initio for having been granted by an "unauthorized person" in
conjunction with an "unauthorized sale," and therefore FNMA lacks any ownership interest in
the Home.
Further it is requested that the Court hold that given the lack of a valid ownership
interest in the Home FNMA lacked standing to bring an unlawful detainer action, and in
particular that the trial court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a Section
810(2) hearing when the ownership was contested, and that the trial court could not have
ruled on the question of possession until all defenses and counterclaims concerning the
question of ownership were finally resolved since the question of ownership is directly related
and inseparable from the question of ownership.
In order to facilitate and promote justice, it is further requested that the Court clarify
that neither court clerks nor judges may automatically schedule Section 810(2) "immediate
occupancy hearings" as occurred in this case inasmuch as the responsibility for requesting

30

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such hearings is the responsibility of the parties, and if a party does not request such a
hearing, it is waived, as would be appropriate in cases where ownership is disputed. Then the
legislative remedy and protection of a possession bond may be sought if desired.
It is therefore requested that the Court vacate the Order of Restitution that was
improperly entered and remand this case with instructions to the trial court to rule that
FNMA's unlawful detainer action is denied due to the lack of any ownership interest as a
matter of law, and that Sundquest is the prevailing party and therefore is entitled to her
reasonable attorney fees under UCA 78B-6-811(3), to be determined on remand to include
fees incurred in bringing this interlocutory appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 3 rd day of November 2011

attorneys forOefendant/Appellant
Douglas R. SMrt
Dan Morse
Kent Holland

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's
Brief was served upon the following counsel or parties by placing a copy of the same in the
U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on this the 3 rd day of November, 2011 :
Brigham J. Lundberg, Esq.
Lundberg & Associates
3269 South Main #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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GARS'
RECORDING REQUESTED BY:
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
WHEN RECORDED MAIL DOCUMENT
TAX STATEMENT TO:
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, 400 National way, SIMI VALLEY,
CA 93065

hi.

OTT

RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
8ACKMAH TITLE SERVICES
167 E 6100 S
SLC UT 84107
BY: J C R , DEPUTY - til 3 P.

TS#: 09-0052070
TSG# 5-049845
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

RESPA
TRUSTEE'S DEED
This Deed is made by RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., as successor Trustee under the hereinafter
described Trust Deed, in favor of FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, 400 National
way, SIM] VALLEY, CA 93065, as Grantee.
WHEREAS, on May 2, 2006, LORAINE SUNDQUIST, as Trustor, executed and delivered to
STEWART T. MATHESON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, as Trustee, for the benefit of MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., as Beneficiary, a certain Trust Deed to secure the
performance by said Trustor of the obligations under a Promissory Note. The Trust Deed was recorded in
the office of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on May 8, 2006, as Instrument No.
9716816, in Book 9291, Page 2006, and covered the property described below; and
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of the Trust Deed in the particulars set
forth in the Notice of Default referred to below; and
WHEREAS, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., was appointed by the Beneficiary as successor
Trustee by a Substitution of Trustee recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on April 28, 2009, as Instrument No. 10686248, in book 9742 page 5730; and
WHEREAS, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N A , executed and filed for record in the Office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, a written Notice of Default containing an election to sell the
trust property, which Notice of Default was recorded on/April 28, 2009, as Instrument No. 10686249, in
book 9715 page 5732; and
WHEREAS RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., the successor Trustee in consequence of the declaration
of default, election and demand for sale, and in accordance with said Trust Deed, executed the Notice of
Trustee's Sale stating that it would sell at public auction to the highest bidder the property therein and
hereafter'described, and fixing the time and place of said sale as May 17, 2011, at 10:30 AM, of said day,
and did cause copies of said notice to be posted for not less than 20 days before the date of sale therein
fixed, at the office of the county recorder in the county wherein said property is located, and also in a
conspicuous place on the property to be sold; and said successor Trustee did cause a copy of the notice to
be "published once a week for three consecutive weeks before the date of sale in the INTERMOUNTAIN
COMMERCIAL RECORD; and
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WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of Utah and all of the provisions of
said Trust DtQd have been complied with as to the acts to be performed and the notices to be given; and
WHEREAS, the successor Trustee did, at the time and place of sale, then and there sell, at public
auction, to Grantee above named, being the highest bidder therefor, the property described for the sum of
SI 5] ,320.90.
• NOW, THEREFORE, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., successor Trustee, in consideration of
the premises recited and of the sum above mentioned, bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the authority in it by said Trust Deed, grants and conveys unto
Grantee above named, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all of that certain
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described as follows:
,m

SEE ATTACHED LEGAL"1'
By: REmNTRUST COMPANY, N.A.

Dated: May 18,2011

3KM~^ & It'll

QnM^n

Authorized Signer

Texas

STATE OF _
COUNTY OF

Tarrant

&hd if before me

Kamra B, Walker

personally appeared

Lanetia Jones

&rth« Sgn

known to me (or proved to me on the oath of _
or through
J to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that h$she executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
W/iT^JE^S Mjf HAND ANft OFFICIAL SEAL

^L

Notary Public's Signature
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PTS# 09-0052070
LEGAL DESCRIPTION
Parcel 1:
Beginning at a point 3368,45 feet West and 372,00 feet South from the Northeast corner of Section
33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East* Salt Lake Base and Meridian* and running thence North
129.00 feet; thence East 8$ feet, more or less, to tbe center of canal; thence Southeasterly along the
center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to the point of beginning.
Parcel 1A:
Right of Way;
Commencing at a point in the center of a 5D foot road and center of canal; west 3191.45 feet and
South 512 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 33, Town3b!p 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Ba$# and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road; thence North 140 feet;
thence due East to center ofcanai and mnning thence Sonth 6 degrees 30* East along center of
canal tbe place of beginning.
Less and excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Rsght-of-Way,
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions* reserraf Ions and right-of-ways appearing
of record.
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J. Kent Holland #1520
J KENT HOLLAND, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 902278
Sandy, Utah 84090-2278
Telephone: (801) 738-3181
jkhollandla w@yahoo. com

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE.
ASSOCIATION,
EVICTION HEARING BRIEF

Plaintiff.
vs,
LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT
DOUG KAHLER, an individual

Civil No: 110408730 EV
Judge Kouris

Defendant.

FACTS
Defendant Loraine Sundquist, hereinafter referred to as
"Sundquist", has been a resident of 1599 East 12700 South,
Draper, Utah since 1996.

On or about 2006 Sundquist contacted American Elite Mortgage to
obtain a new "mortgage" on her property.
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3.

Sundquist was advised at the time of closing, the paper had been
transferred to Countywide. However, at that time, Sundquist
executed a Trust Deed to Stewart T. Matheson, Attorney at Law, as
Trustee, for the benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc., as Beneficiary.

4.

In 2008, after learning Countrywide was no longer an operating
busmess entity, Sundquist contacted her original loan officer at
•American Elite Mortgage and he advised her to contact Bank of
America, hereinafter referred to as "BAC" to verify if BAC was the
correct servicing entity entitled to receive her payment.

5.

Between October 2008 and February 2009, Sundquist contacted
BAC on multiple occasions, via telephone, requesting evidence of
BAC as her loan servicing company, Sundquist was instead
transferred to a loan modification specialist whom then indicated
she may be eligible for a new loan or modification and would she
like to make application.
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6.

Sundquist then submitted to BAC financial documentation to BAC
for prequalification of a modification and/or new lower interest
rate loan.

7.

In February 2009. BAC loan representative informed Sundquist she
was not eligible for a loan nor a loan modification unless she was
60 days in arrears.

8.

On or about March 2009 Sundquist, per BAC's representative's
direction and implied promise to modify, Sundquist stopped loan
payments to Countrywide Mortgage.

9.

Not hearing timely from BAC, Sundquist grew more anxious, but
continued to contact BAC for the purpose obtaining either the
status of the promised loan modification and to obtain the
documentation showing the identity of the note holder and the
^chain of transfer to that note holder to ensure payments were going
to the right entity.
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10.

Finally, on December 17, 2010 BAC Home Loan Servicing (a
subsidiary of Bank of America, NA) received Sundquist's written
request for information regarding the identity of the beneficiary of
her Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. See Exhibit"A ".

11.

In the same letter dated December 18, 2010 from BAC, Sundquist
was told that her current investor/beneficiary of her Note and Trust
Deed FNMA ACT\ACT, See Exhibit"A".

12.

Also, regarding her request for copies of the documents
transferring ownership of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, in
BAC's Sundquist was told she was not entitled to copies of the
requested documents, "Accordingly, we respectfully decline this
request In lieu of providing you with the
information/documentation you requested, we have enclosed
herewith a certified true and correct copy of the NOTE". The Note
sent was not Sundquist's Note as can be seen in the attached Note
but a note for property located in Jacksonville, FL with Nakita
Perinet and Taniger Perinet as Borrowers. See Exhibit "A ".
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13.

Sundquist, following the receipt of that letter with the wrong
attached Note, made numerous telephonic requests to BAC for the
requested documents including a copy of her note, with no
response.

14.

Januaiy 2011, a NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE was placed on
Sundquist door, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed in favor
of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC. as Beneficiary, and noticed the Trustee as RECONTRUST
COMPANY, N.A., covering the Sundquist real property7. See
Exhibit «B".

15.

On June 1, 2011. Sundquist had on her door posted a NOTICE TO
QUIT from Lundberg & Associates, attorney for FNMA stating on
May 17, 2011, at 10:30 am ReconTrust Company. N.A., Trustee, m
favor of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., as nominee for American's Wholesale Lender
and is successors and assigned had been sold to FNMA and FNMA
has elected to terminated tenancy at will. See Exhibit "Cy\
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I:

Is Reconstrust Company. N.A. a valid Trustee under Utah Code §
§57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 with the "Power of Sale" such that it may
conduct foreclosures?

The entity who gave Sundquist NOTICE OF TRUSTEE SALE was ReconTrust
Company, N.A. See Exhibit "BJ\ ReconTrust Company, N.A. is neither an active
member the Utah State Bar residing in the state of Utah where the property is located nor
"any title insurance company or agency that:

(A) holds a certificate of authority or

license under Title 31A, Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state;" §
§57-1-21. It is clear that the subject matter foreclosure was not done in compliance with
Utah Statutes and is hence illegal. See Exhibit "B'\

This point was specifically addressed by the Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, for
the State of Utah, in a letter to Brian T. Moynihan, President of Bank of America, dated
May 19,2011. "Utah Code § §57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23provide that the only valid
trustees of trust deeds with the "power of sale" are those who are either members of
Utah State Bar or title insurance companies. Since ReconTrust is neither of these, all
real estate foreclosures conducted by ReconTrust in the State of Utah are not in
compliance with Utah's statutes, and are hence illegal" See Exhibit "D".

Therefore, if the foreclosure of Sundquist's property was not in conformance with
Utah Code and further deemed illegal bv the Utah State Attorney General, the Trustee had
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no authority to neither conduct the sale nor deed the Sundquist property7 to Federal
National Mortgage Association. Hence, the Notice to Quit and the Eviction action by
Plaintiff fails, Sundquist cannot under Utah law be evicted.

ISSUE 2:

is ReconTrust Company, N.A. exempt in exercising it fiduciary

powers from the aforementioned Utah Statutes doe to the fact that it is a subdivision
of BAC, a national bank?

The NATIONAL BANK ACT which grants national banks the authority to act in
a fiduciary capacity does not exempt the application of the applicable Utah Statutes. 12
U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b) states "when not in contravention of State or local law".
Therefore, ReconTrust Company, N.A. cannot rely on Federal statutes to allow it
to act as a valid Trustee of Trust Deeds with power of sale in the State of Utah, Attorney
General Shurtleff in his letter specifically said, ".. .the section of the National Bank Act
granting national banks authority to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that
such authority shall be exercised only 'when not in contravention of State or local
lawV'12 U.S.C.92a(a) and (b). See Exhibit «&'.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, ReconTrust Company N.A, does not qualify under Utah statute as a
Trustee with the power of sale. Further, regardless of the application of the Federal
statute, it still must not be in contravention of Utah statutes, Therefore, the foreclosure by
ReconTrust Company N.A, violated Utah statutes and is void. Since it is void, the
Trustee has no authority to issue a Trustee's deed to Federal National Mortgage
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Association (FNMA), the Plaintiff to this action. Hence FNMA has no standing or basis
upon which it can evict Sundquist.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2011.

J. Kent Holland
Attorney for the Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S
Eviction Hearing Brief was mailed this 24th day of June 2011 to the following:
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862)
Brad G. DeHann (USB No. 08168)
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT " A "
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Bank of America ^ | § ^
Home Loans
s

~~~™ "^^

.

400 National Way
Mailstop CA6-919-02-22
Simi Valley., CA 93065

December 17,2010

Loraine Sundquist
1599 East 12700 South
Draper, UT 84020
Re:

Borrower Name(s): Loraine Sundquist
Property Address: 1599 East 12700 South. Draper, UT 84020
Loan Number Ending in 94778

Dear Ms, Sundquist:
We are in receipt of your correspondence undated, which was received on November 18, 2010, by BAC
Home Loans Servicing., LP (i4BAC Home Loans77), a subsidiary of Bank of America, N.A., regarding the
referenced loan,
You requested, information regarding the investor of this loan, which is as follows:
FNMA ACT/ACT
13150 World Gate Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
703-8334700
Further, with respect to your request for the original NOTE, you cite no authority supporting your claim
that you are entitled to the information/documentation you requested, and we are not aware of the
existence of any such authority, Accordingly, we respectfully decline this request. In lieu of providing
you with the information/documentation you requested, we have enclosed herewith a certified true and
correct copy of the NOTE,
If you have concerns or questions regarding the foreclosure, please contact BAC Home loans' FBRM
Customer Escalation Team at (866) 200-9624. Thank you for this opportunity' to be of service.
Sincerely.

Kirsten Volmer
Litigation Specialist
Foreclosure, Bankruptcy, and Risk Management (FBRM)
Qualified Written Request (QWR) Group
Enclosure
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Prepared by-; ASHLEY WHITESIDE

LOAN #: 176653368

NOTE
AUGUST

03,

2007

FLORIDA

IDate]

[City]
6 61

TREE

SWALLOW

COURT,

JACKSONVILLE,

(State)
FL

32225

[Property Address]

1* B O R R O W E R ' S P R O M I S E T O P A Y
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U . S , $ 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
plus interest, to the order of the Lender. The Lender is
COUNTRYWIDE

HOME

LOANS,

(this amount is called "Principal"),

INC.

I will m a k e all payments tinder this Note in the form of cash, check or money order.
I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. T h e Lender or anyone who takes this N o t e by transfer and w h o is
entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the "Note Holder,"
2, I N T E R E S T
Interest will be charged on -unpaid principal until the full amount of Principal has been paid. I will p a y interest at a yearly
rate of
7 . 7 5 0 %.
T h e interest rate- required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay both before and after any default described in Section 6(B)
of this N o t e .
3* P A Y M E N T S
(A) T i m e a n d P l a c e of Faymenis
I will pay principal and interest by making a p a y m e n t every month.
1 will make m y monthly payment on the F I R S T
, day of each month beginning on
S E P T E M B E R 0 2 , 2 0 0 7 . I will m a k e these payments every month until I have paid all of the principal a n d interest
and a n y other charges described below that I m a y o w e under this Note. Each monthly p a y m e n t will be applied a s of its
scheduled due date and will be applied to interest before Principal. If, on AUGUST 0 1 , 2 0 3 7
, 1 still o w e amounts
under this Note, I will pay those amounts in full on that date, which is called the "Maturity Date."
I will m a k e m y monthly payments a t
P . O . B o x 6 6 0 6 9 4 / D a l l a s , TX 7 5 2 6 6 - 0 6 9 4
* '
-'
.
or at a different place if required b y the Note Holder,
(B) A m o u n t of M o n t h l y
Payments
M y monthly payment will b e in the amount of U . S . $ 2 , 3 6 4 . 1 6
4, B O R R O W E R ' S R I G H T T O P R E P A Y
I have the right to make payments of Principal a t any time before they are due. A payment of Principal only is k n o w n as a
"Prepayment,"' W h e n I make a Prepayment, I will tell th& Note Holder in writing that I a m doing so, I may n o t designate a
p&ym&ni as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments d u e under the Note.
I may make a full Prepayment or partial Prepayments without paying a Prepayment charge. T h e Note Holder will u s e m y
Prepayments to reduce the amount of Pnncipal that I o w e under this Note. However, the Note Holder may apply m y Prepayment
to the accrued and unpaid interest on ih& Prepayment a m o u n t before applying m y Prepayment to reduce the Principal amount of
the Note, If I m a k e a partial Prepayment, there will b e n o changes in the, due date or in the amount of m y monthly p a y m e n t
unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes. „ - *
5, L O A N C H A R G E S
If a law, which applies to this loan &nd which sets maximuxn.'loan charges, is finally interpreted s o that the interest or other
loan charges collected or to b e collected i n connection with this loan exceed the permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge
shall be xeduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from
me which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. The N o t e Holder may choose to m a k e this refund b y reducing the
Principal I o w e under this N o t e or by making a direct payment to m e . If a refund reduces Principal, the reduction will b e treated
as a partial Prepayment.
6, B O R R O W E R ' S F A I L U R E T O P A T A S REQTJJLKED
(A) L a t e C h a r g e for O v e r d u e Payments
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any. monthly .payment by the end of F I F T E E N
calendar
days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder.-The amount of the charge will b e
5 . 0 0 0 % of m y
overdue payment of principal and interest I will pay this late charge promptly but only once on each late payment.
(B) D e f a u l t
"
,
If I d o not p a y the full amount of each monthly payment on the date it i s due, I will b e in default.
FLORIDA FIXED RATE NOTE-Slngte Family-Fannfefc/lae/FrecfrileMac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT
VMP MORTGAGE FORMS - (300)521 -7291
<gg^-5N<RJ <0O05).O1 C H L (08/02X4)
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(C) Notice of Default
If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a
certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately jthe full amount of Principal which has not been paid and all
the interest that I owe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me or
dslivGrod by other means.
(D) No Waiver By Note Holder
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as described
above, the Note Holder will still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time.
•(E) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in.full as described above, the Note Holder will have the right to be
paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this -Note to tlje extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those
expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees.
7. GIVING-OF NOTICES
Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by
delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Propeny Address above or at a different address if I give the Note
Holder a notice of my different address.
Any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this, Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first
class mail to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a different address if I am given a notice of that
different address.
S, OBLIGATIONS' OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE
If more than one person signs this Note, each person is folly and personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in
this Note, including the promise to pay the full amount owed. Any person who is a guarantor, surety or endorser of this Note is
also obligated to do these things. Any person who takes over these obligations, including the obligations of a guarantor, surety
or endorser of this Note, is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note. The Note Holder may enforce its rights
under this Note against each person individually or against all of us together. This means that any one of us may be required to
pay all of the- amounts owed under this Note.
9* WAIVERS
I and any other person who has obligations under this Note waive the rights of Presentment and Notice of Dishonor,
"Presentment" means the right to require the Note Holder to< demand payment of amounts due. "Notice of Dishonor" means the
right to require the Note Holder to give, notice to other persons that .amounts due have not fosen paid,
:
10, UNIFORM SECUKKD NOTE
This Note is a uniform instrument with limited variations in some jurisdictions. In addition to the protections given to the
Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Dood of Trust, or Security Deed Qh& "Security instrument"), dated the same date as
this Note, protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the promises which I make in this
Note. That-Security Instrument describes how and under what conditions I may be required to make immediate payment in full
of all amounts 1 owe under this Note, Some of those conditions are ^escribed as follows:.
If all or mry part of the Property or any Interest in the Property Is* sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent,
Lender may require immediate payment m full of all sums' secured by this Security Instrument. However, this
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law.
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a
period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice lsvgiven in accordance with Section i5 within which
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Mstrurnent without further
notice or demand on Borrower.

11. DOCIJMENTAR1T TAX
The state documentary tax due on this Note has been paid on the mortgage securing this indebtedness.
WITNESS THE HAND(S) AND SEAL(S) OF THE. UNDERSIGNED,
)
,

.

,

(Seal)

MAKITA PERI MET

-Soixower

^ - — / ^

\^

)

1 \UrJ

_ (Sealj .
-Borrowei:

^ ^ '

TANGIER FBRT&ST

*

^

(Seal)
-Borrow er

(Seal)
-Bosxcwer

[Sign Original Only]

"ORIGINAL«
<SB& -5N<FL) <CO0S).01 CHL (08/02)
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NOTICE O F TRUSTEE'S SALE
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, payable in
lawful money of the United States at the time of the sale, t;at the East Main Entrance (Rotunda) of the
Scott M. Matheson Salt Lake County Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah", on
January 28; 2010. at 10:30 AM, of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed dated May 2,
2006 and executed by LORAINE SUNDQUIST, as Trustors) in favor of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. as Beneficiaryr covering the following real property located in Salt
Lake County:
""SEE ATTACHED LEGAL""
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.
Tax Parcel No.: 28-33-127-008
The address of the property is purported to be 1599 EAST 12700 SOUTH, DRAPER, UT 84020-8316.
The undersigned disclaims liability for any error in the address. The current Beneficiary of the trust deed
is MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., and the record owners of the
property as of the recording of the notice of default is reported to be LORAINE SUNDQUIST.
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the trustee, RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., $5,000.00 at the
sale and the balance of the purchase price by 12:00 noon the day following the sale and deliverable to:
Matheson, Mortensen, et al, 648 East First South, Salt Lake City, UT 84102. Both payments must be in
the form of a cashier's check or money order and made payable to RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.,
cash and Bank "Official Checks"' are not acceptable. A trustee's deed will be made available to the
successful bidder within three business days following receipt of the bid amount. The sale is made
without any warranty whatsoever, including but not limited to any warranty as to title, liens, possession,
taxes, encumbrances, or condition of the property. The sale is subject to a workout reinstatement, payoff,
sale cancellation or postponement, incorrect bidding instructions, bankruptcy, or any other circumstance
of which the trustee is unaware. In the event any of the foregoing apply, the sale will be void and the
successful bidder's funds will be returned without any liability to the trustee or beneficiary for interest or
any other damages.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT RECONTRUST COMPANY, NA. IS ATTEMPTING TO
COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT
PURPOSE, AND THAT THE DEBT MAY BE .DISPUTED.
Dated: December 18, 2009
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Tax ID: 28-33-127-008

By:

/

Gadalia Estremera-Caquias, Team Member
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.
2380 Performance Dr, TX2-985-07-03
Richardson, TX 75082
(800)281-8219x3405
Regular Business Hours: Monday - Friday,
8:00a.m. to 5:00p.m., Central Time
TS#: 09 -0052070
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NOTICE TO QUIT
Loiaine Sundquist
'-l#99€ast 12700 South
Draper, UT 84020

/_; . / > / / - \
^
' '

You are notified, pursuant to provisions of sections §78B~6-802.5 and §78B~6-802, Utah Code
Annotated, that you are required to vacate the property located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper,
UT 84020, more particularly described as follows:
Parcel 11.
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372,00 feet Southfromthe Northeast
comer of Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to
the center of canal; thence Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due
East of beginning; thence West to the point of beginning.
Parcel 1A:
Right of Way:
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West
3191.45 feet and South 512 feet from the Northeast comer of Section 33, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running ihence West 177
feet along center of road: thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal
and running thence South 6°30? East along the center of canal the place of
beginning.
Less .and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation
Right-of-Way.
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-ofways appearing of record.
and surrender the possession thereof to Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") within
five (5) days after service of this notice upon you.
On May 17,2011, at 10:30 a.m,? Recontrust Company, N A , Trustee under a Trust Deed dated May
2, 2006, and executed by Loiaine Sundquist, as trustor, in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registraiton
Systems, Inc. as nominee for America's Wholesale Lender, its successors and assigns, caused the
above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. .At the sale, the property was sold to FNMA.
From and since that time, you have been a tenant at will. FNMA has elected to terminate said
tenancy.
In the event that you fail to vacate the property within five (5) days from the date on which you
receive this notice, you will be guilty of unlawful detainer as provided by sections §786-6-802.5
and §78B-6~802, Utah Code Annotated, and appropriate legal action will be instituted against you
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

oil which you receive this notice, if you are not a bona fide tenant you will be guilty of unlawful
detainer as provided by sections §78B-6-802.5 and §78B-6-802? Utah Code Annotated and
appropriate legal action will be instituted against you for possession of the premises and for treble
damages as provided for by section §78B-6-81L Utah Code Annotated. A bona fide tenant is
defined as a renter or leasehold occupant paying fair market rental resulting from an arms length
transaction.
DATED this 2M

day of May, 201L
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES

B^jua./^ € ^ rww

Richard Gunnerson
^ ^ B r a d G. DeHaan
Brigham Lundberg
Attorneys for FNMA
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801)263-3400
L&ACaseNo: I1-13010/KHE

>
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STATE OF UTAH

MARK L . SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOHN E. SWALLOW

Protecting Utah • Protecting You

Chief Deputy

KIRK TORGENSEN
Chief Deputy

May 19, 2011

Brian T. Moynihan
President, Bank of America
100 North Tryon St
Charlotte, NC 28255
Re: ReconTrust Co., N.A.
Dear Mr. Moynihan:
As Attorney General for the State of Utah, I ®n statutorily charged with enforcing Utah's
laws in the State of Utah. In that capacity I have determined that ReconTrust. N.A., is not in
compliance -with Utah Code §§57-1-21 and 57-1-23 when conducting real estate foreclosures in
the State of Utah.
Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 provide that the only valid trustees of trust deeds
with the "power of sale'5 are those who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title
insurance companies. Since ReconTmst is neither of these, all real estate foreclosures conducted
by ReconTmst in the State of Utah are not in compliance with Utah's statutes, and axe hence
illegal
These code sections were passed by the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2004 for the
specific purpose of protecting Utah citizens m their homes, when they are faced with the potential
of a real estate foreclosure. The constitutionality7- of this legislation was ultimately upheld by the
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Shurtleff v. Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d 1033 (2009),
It is my understanding that ReconTrust claims that as a national bank it is exempt from
following Utah law in exercising itsfiduciaiypowers. This office adamantly disagrees with that
position on the basis that the section of the National Bank Act granting national banks authority
to act in afiduciarycapacity specifically states that such authority shall be exercised only Ciwhen
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b).
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Brian T. Moynihan
President, Bank of America
May 1-9. 2011
Page Two of Two

Thus, Reconl rust's exercise of fiduciary powers in the State of Utah is a violation not
only of State law, but also applicable federal law.
The purpose of this letter is to give you notice that the Utah Attorney General's office
intends to enforce Utah's statutes against those conducting business in Utah, and that includes
enforcement of the real estate trustee qualification statute. I would appreciate a response to this
letter from you within 30 days of the date of this letter informing me of how you intend to
proceed, I am willing to discuss this issue with you or your attorneys if yon like.
Sincerely,

lark ETShurtleff
Utah Attorney General
MLS/se
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Utah
Code
Title 57 Real Estate
Chapter
Conveyances
1

^1

Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
^i^any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state where
fe^t&tftistor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to:
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation secured
by the trust deed;
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust deed and by
law;
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the property
secured by the trust deed;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the
United States:
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a trust
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(ivj.any title insurance company or agency that:
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license unijgj Title 31 A, Insurance Code, to conduct
insurance business in the state;.
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm
Credit Administration or its successor.
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1). a person maintains a bona fide office within the
state if that person maintains a physical office in the state:
(i) that is open to the public:
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person:
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds.
(c) This Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing prior to May
14, I9635 nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that trust deed.
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002. Chapter 209, to this Subsection (1) apply only
to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v)5 or (vi).
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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§ 92a* Tryst Powers,
Archive
United States Statutes
Title 12. Banks and Banking
Chapter 2, NATIONAL BANKS
Subchapter IV, REGULATION OF THE BANKING BUSINESS; POWERS AND DUTIES OF NATIONAL BANKS
Current through P.L 111-290
§ 92a, Trust Powers
(a)

Authority of Comptroller of the Currency
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by special permit to national
banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor,

administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of
lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which
come into competition with national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national
bank is located.
(b)

Grant and exercise of powers deemed not in contravention of State or local law
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or ail of the foregoing powers by
State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks, the granting to and the
exercise of such powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within
the meaning of this section.

(c)

Segregation of fiduciary and general assets; separate books and records; access of State banking
authorities to reports of examinations, books, records, and assets
National banks exercising any or all of the powers enumerating W in this section shall segregate ail assets
held in any fiduciary capacity from the general assets of the bank and shall keep a separate set of books and
records showing in proper detail ail transactions engaged in under authority of this section. The State banking
authorities may have access to reports of examination made by the Comptroller of the Currency insofar as such
reports relate to the trust department of such bank, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing
the State banking authorities to examine the books, records, and assets of such bank.

(d)

Prohibited operations; separate investment account; collateral for certain funds used in conduct of
business
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No national bank shall receive in its trust department deposits of current funds subject to check or the
deposit of checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other items for collection or exchange purposes. Funds deposited
or held in trust by the bank awaiting investment shall be carried in a separate account and shall not be used by
the bank in the conduct of-its business unless it shall first set aside in the trust department United States bonds
or other securities approved by the Comptroller of the Currency.

(e)

Lien and claim upon bank failure
in the event of the failure of such bank the owners of the funds held in trust for investment shall have a lien
on the bonds or other securities so set apart in addition to their claim against the estate of the bank.

(f)

Deposits of securities for protection of private or court trusts; execution of and exemption from
bond
Whenever the laws of a State require corporations acting in a fiduciary capacity to deposit securities with
the State authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, national banks so acting shall be required to
make similar deposits and securities so deposited shall be heid for the protection of private or court trusts, as
provided by the State law. National banks in such cases shall not be required to execute the bond usually
required of individuals if State corporations under similar circumstances are exempt from this requirement.
National banks shall have power to execute such bond when so required by the laws of the State.

(g)

Officials' oath or affidavit
In any case in which the iaws of a State require that a corporation acting as trustee, executor, administrator,
or in any capacity specified in this section, shall take an oath or make an affidavit, the president, vice president,
cashier, or trust officer of such national bank may take the necessary oath or execute the necessary affidavit.

(h)

Loans of trust funds to officers and employees prohibited; penalties
It shall be unlawful for any national banking association to lend any officer, director, or employee any funds
heid in trust under the powers conferred by this section. Any officer, director, or employee making such loan, or
to whom such loan is made, may be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or may
be both fsned and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court.

(i)

Considerations determinative of grant or denial of applications; minimum capital and surplus for
issuance of permit
In passing upon applications for permission to exercise the powers enumerated in this section, the
Comptroller of the Currency may take into consideration the amount of capital and surplus of the applying bank,
whether or not such capital and surplus is sufficient under the circumstances of the case, the needs of the
community to be served, and any other facts and circumstances that seem to him proper, and may grant or
refuse the application accordingly; Provided, That no permit shall be issued to any national banking association
having a capital and surplus less than the capital and surplus required by State law of State banks, trust
companies, and corporations exercising such powers.
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Surrender o f authorization; board resolution; Comptroller certification; activities affected;
regulations
Any national banking association desiring to surrender its right to exercise the powers granted under this
section, in order to relieve itself of the necessity of complying with the requirements of this section, or to have
returned to \i any securities which it may have deposited with the State authorities for the protection of private or
court trusts, or for any other purpose, may file with the Comptrolier of the Currency a certified copy of a resolution
of its board of directors signifying such desire. Upon receipt of such resolution, the Comptroller of the Currency,
after satisfying himself that such bank has been relieved in accordance with State law of ail duties as trustee,
executoryJ2i administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of
estates of lunatics or other fiduciary, under court, private, or other appointments previously accepted under
authority of this section, may, in his discretion, issue to such bank a certificate certifying that such bank is no
longer authorized to exercise the powers granted by this section. Upon the issuance of such a certificate by the
Comptroller of the Currency, such bank

(1)

shall no longer be subject to the provisions of this section or the regulations of the Comptroller of the
Currency made pursuant thereto,

(2)

shall be entitled to have returned to it any securities which it may have deposited with the State
authorities for the protection of private or court trusts, and

(3)

shall not exercise thereafter any of the powers granted by this section without first applying for and
obtaining a new permit to exercise such powers pursuant to the provisions of this section, The
Comptroller of the Currency is authorized and empowered to promulgate such regulations as he may
deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the
powers granted therein.

Revocation; procedures appiicabie
(1)

In addition to the authority conferred by other law, if, in the opinion of the Comptroller of the Currency,
a national banking association is unlawfully or unsoundly exercising, or has unlawfully or unsoundly
exercised,-or has faiied for a period of five consecutive years to exercise, the powers granted by this
section or otherwise fails or has faiied to comply with the requirements of this section, the Comptroller
may issue and serve upon the association a notice of intent to revoke the authority of the association to
exercise the powers granted by this section. The notice shall contain a statement of the facts
constituting the alleged unlawful or unsound exercise of powers, or failure to exercise powers, or failure
to comply, and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether an order
revoking authority to exercise such powers should issue against the association.

(2)

Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 1818 (h) of this title, and
subject to judicial review as provided in such section, and shall be fixed for a date not earlier than thirty
days nor later than sixty days after service of such notice unless an earlier or later date is set by the
Comptroller at the request of any association so served.

(3)

Unless the association so served shall appear at the hearing by a duly authorized representative, it shall
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be deemed to have consented to the issuance of the revocation order. In the event of such consent, or if
upon the record made at any such hearing, the Comptroller shali find that any allegation specified in the
notice of charges has been established, the Comptroller may issue and serve upon the association an
order prohibiting it from accepting any new or additional trust accounts and revoking authority to
exercise any and all powers granted by this section, except that such order shall permit the association
to continue to service all previously accepted trust accounts pending their expeditious divestiture or
termination.
14)

A revocation order shali become effective not earlier than the expiration of thirty days after service of
such order upon the association so served (except in the case of a revocation order issued upon
consent, which shall become effective at the time specified therein), and shall remain effective and
enforceable, except to such extent as it is stayed, modified, terminated, or set aside by action of the
Comptroller or a reviewing court.

[1] So \n original. Probably should be "enumerated". [2] So in original. Probably should be "executor,".
Notes from the Office of Law Revision CounseS
Current through 2008-06-23
Source
(Pub, L. 87-722, § 1, Sept 285 1962, 76 Stat 668; Pub. L. 96-221, title VII, § 704, Mar. 31,
1980, 94 Stat 187.)
Amendments
1980-Subsec. (k). Pub, L. 96-221 added subsec. (k).
Savings Provision
Section 2 of Pub, L 87-722 provided that: "Nothing contained in this Act [enacting
this section, amending sections 581 and 584 (a)(2) of Title 26, and repealing
section 248 (k) of this title] shall be deemed to affect or curtail the right of any
national bank to act in fiduciary capacities under a permit granted before the date
of enactment of this Act [Sept. 28, 1962] by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, nor to affect the validity of any transactions entered into at any
time by any national bank pursuant to such permit, On and after the date of
enactment of this Act the exercise of fiduciary powers by national banks shall be
subject to the provisions of this Act and the requirements of regulations issued by
the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the authority granted by this Act."
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EXHIBIT "F"

•
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§ 57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid - Trustees deed
delivered to purchaser - Recitals - Effect
Archive
Utah Statutes
Title 57. Real Estate
Chapter 1. Conveyances
Current through 2010 Legislative Session
§ 57-1-28= Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of bid - Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser Recitals - Effect
(1} (a) The purchaser at the saie shali pay the price bid as directed by the trustee.
(b) The beneficiary shall receive a credit on the beneficiary's bid in an amount not to exceed the amount
representing:
(i) the unpaid principal owed;
(ii) accrued interest as of the date of the sale;
(Hi) advances for the payment of.
(A) taxes;
(B) insurance; and
(C) maintenance and protection of the trust property;
(iv) the beneficiary's lien on the trust property; and
(v) costs of saie, including reasonable trustee's and attorney's fees.
(2) (a) (i) Within three business days of the day the trustee receives payment of the price bid, the trustee shali make
the trustee's 6BB6 available to the purchaser.
(11) If the trustee does not comply with this Subsection (2)(a), the trustee is liable for any loss incurred by the
purchaser because of the trustee's failure to comply with this Subsection (2)(a).
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(b) The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-136 relating to the exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described in the trustee's deed, including recitals
concerning:
(i) any mailing, persona! deliver/, and publication of the notice of default;
(ii) any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice of saie; and
(ill) the conduct of saie.
(c) The recitals described in Subsection (2)(b):
(i) constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 ; and
(ii) are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all
right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and the trustor's successors in interest and of ail persons claiming by, through,
or under them, in and to the property sold, including all right, title, interest, and claim in and to the property acquired by
the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall
be considered effective and relate back to the time of the saie.
(4) In accordance with Section 57-3-106, an interest of a purchaser in a trustee's deed that is recorded with the
county recorder may not be divested if a person records an affidavit or other document purporting to rescind or cancel the
trustee's deed.
History, A m e n d e d by Chapter 381, 2010 Genera! Session

>
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Association (FNMA), the Plaintiff to this action. Hence FNMA has no standing or basis
upon which it can evict Sundquist.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2011.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S
Eviction Hearing Brief was mailed this 24th day of June 2011 to the following:
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862)
Brad G. DeHann (USB No. 08168)
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT

A H 0 4 2011
WEST JORDAN DEPI
IN THE 3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT - WEST JORDAN COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4

FEDERAL NATL MORTGAGE,
PLAINTIFF,

5
6
7

) EVICTION HEARING
)

vs
LORAINE SUNDQUIST,

) CASE
APPEAL

110408730
20110575

8
DEFENDANT.

) JUDGE MARK KOURIS

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

June 27, 2011.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

18

(From Electronic Recording)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE OOUFT

SEP 2 0 2011
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3

A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S
FOR PLAINTIFF:

4

BRIGHAM J. LUNDBERG, ESQ.
LUNDBERG & ASOCIATES
3269 SO. MAIN #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115

5
6
FOR DEFENSE:
7
8

J. KENT HOLLAND, ESQ.
J. KENT HOLLAND P.C.
PO BOX 902278

9
10
11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

12
13
14

PAGE REF
ARGUMENT BY MR. HOLLAND
ARGUMENT BY MR. LUNDBERG
RULING

4
8
11

15
16
17
18
19
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24
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-l-N-G-S

2

(June 27, 2011) .

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MR. HOLLAND:

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. HOLLAND:

7

Your Honor, number 12.
Which is?
Fannie Mae versus Loraine

Sundquist.

8
9

Good morning.

THE JUDGE:
it here.

All right.

Fannie Mae.

I don't see

Versus Sundquist?

10

MR. HOLLAND:

Yes, Your Honor.

11

THE JUDGE:

12

Let's call the case of Federal National Mortgage

Oh,

13

versus Loraine Sundquist.

14

8730.

here it is.

I'm sorry.

This is a case that ends in

Counsel?

15

MR. LUNDBERG:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. HOLLAND:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. HOLLAND:

Brigham Lundberg for Fannie Mae.
Thank you.
Kent Holland for Loraine Sundquist.

Okay.
We prepared a brief to show why

20

that Fannie Mae is not entitled to, to evict Loraine

21

Sundquist.

22

THE JUDGE:

23

the reason is.

24

when it came in.

25

All right.

Go ahead and tell me what

I've had, I reviewed your brief on Friday

MR. HOLLAND:

Yes.
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1
2

THE JUDGE:
here.

3

But go ahead and let's create a record

Go ahead.
ARGUMENT BY MR. HOLLAND

4

MR. HOLLAND;

To handle, to be able to foreclose

5

on her property the trustee has to be a cerrain type of

6

trustee under Utah law under 57-1-2 and 57-1-23.

7

have to be a member of the Utah State Bar in good standing,

8

residing in Utah, or they have to be an authorized title

9

insurance authorized to do business in the State of Utah.

And they

10

The trust company that conducted the foreclosure is neither

11

of those and a, so they, they fail on that point.

12

Now, ReconTrust is a division apparently of Bank

13

of America who claims that under the federal banking laws

14

they can, they can be the trustee.

15

12 USC 92A(a)(b), these powers to be exempt as long as they

16

are not in, were not in contravention of state and local law

17

is what is contained in the federal law.

18

it.

But in quoting the

So they can't be

19

And they have tried to act as the trustee for

20

purposes of the foreclosure of her, of her property and

21

they...

22

Bank of America, which I attached as a copy, specifically

23

points that out that they cannot do that.

And the attorney general in his letter of May 19 to

24

And in fact, there's a senate bill that is set

25

for, that is signed by the governor and hasn't gone into
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1

effect I don't think yet, it may be in effect right now,

2

and that is for penalties for, against people or like, or

3

companies like ReconTrust who have wrongfully done

4

foreclosures when they are not authorized to do so.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

The actual eviction?

7

So what are you objecting to today?

MR. HOLLAND:

Yes, we are.

They can't evict if

8

they don't, if they weren't in any, if they couldn't have

9

tendered the deed to Fannie Mae.

10
11

THE JUDGE:
entered into?

12

MR. HOLLAND:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

property?

15

went?
MR. HOLLAND:

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MR. HOLLAND:

THE JUDGE:

21

MR. HOLLAND:

22

THE JUDGE:

24
25

Default.

Did they default on the
Is that how it

Well, it went for some time.
How long?
Over two and a half years my client

tried to g e t —

20

23

When was the foreclosure?

And it was foreclosed soon after?

16

19

When was the, when was the default

yet then.

So for two and a half years—
She's tried to get the authority—
—

your client hasn't made a payment

Is that right?
MR. HOLLAND:

No.

She's made payments up, up

until she was told not to do so by Bank of America so that
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1

she could get a, qualify for a new loan.

2

THE JUDGE:

3

MR. HOLLAND:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

since March of 2009?

6

And how long ago was that?
That was in March of 2 009.
So she hasn't made a house payment

MR. HOLLAND:

I don't believe so.

We don't even

7

know who we are supposed to be making house payments.

She

8

had been making house payments to Countrywide up to that

9

point.

10

And she just asked authority to show how they,

11

that she was, why she was supposed to make nhem to them.

12

And that went, as you can see by the brief and all of the

13

documents they, they not only, she wanted to see the trust

14

deed note that they were authorizing and they sent her a

15

trustee note from somebody in Florida.

16
17
18

THE JUDGE:

Well, give me, well, I think we are

moving in time now.
So after she quit making payments when was it?

19

Why did she stop making payments?

20

MR. HOLLAND:

21
22
23

Because she wasn't sure she was

making payments to the correct entity, number one.
THE JUDGE:

So she's got that money sitting in

escrow now—

24

MR. HOLLAND:

25

THE JUDGE:

I don't know what—
—

so when if we figure out who the
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1

right payment i s —

2
3

MR. HOLLAND:
Your Honor.

4
5

I don't know whether she does or not.

THE JUDGE:

MR. HOLLAND:

7

THE JUDGE:

8

MR. HOLLAND:

9

THE JUDGE:

Will she be prepared then to make up

If, if she needs to.
All right.
—
—

I think—

What i s —

down the road—

the mortgage payment currently, do

you know?

11
12

But—

those back payments to stay in the house?

6

10

I cannot tell you that,

MR. HOLLAND:

I don't know.

I think itTs $700 a

month.

13

THE JUDGE:

So if we times 700 by what, 24, 3 7

14

times, what is that, $42,000, she'd be ready to pay that at

15

this point as a bond?

16

MR. HOLLAND:

I don't know.

17

that's what we are here for right now.

18

is Fannie Mae is trying to evict her—

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. HOLLAND:

21

THE JUDGE:

22

the eviction, if I stayed t h e —

23
24
25

Right.
—

What we are here for

So if I stay—

based on their transfer—

Right.

MR. HOLLAND:

But I don't think

But if I, right, if I stayed

And they don't have any right to

it.
THE JUDGE:

—

eviction to allow you to, to
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1

litigate this matter—

2

MR. HOLLAND:

3

THE JUDGE:

4

Yes.
—

then she would put in the bank the

amount that she owed up to this point in escrow?

5

MR. HOLLAND:

Well, she could maybe post a bond,

6

I don't know if she has all of the cash, but she could

7

probably post a bond.

8
9
10

THE JUDGE:

would equal the amount of payments that she had missed at
this point?

11
12

MR. HOLLAND:

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. HOLLAND:

16
17
18

I would think that would be

possible.

13

15

Well, she could post a bond that

You do think so?
I don't know.

That I don't know.

I'd have to discuss her finances with her.
THE JUDGE:

Counsel?

ARGUMENT BY MR. LUNDBERG
MR. LUNDBERG:

Your Honor, the only issue here

19

seems to be ReconTrustrs authority to foreclose.

20

already been litigated.

21

is from Judge Waddoups in the federal court and it

22

specifically states that through the National Banking Act

23

it preempts the legislation here in the State of Utah.

24

Therefore there's, there's nothing currently that prevents

25

ReconTrust from foreclosing in the state.

This has

The only actual opinion out there

That's been
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1

appealed to the 10th Circuit.

2

this point.

3

them to foreclose.

4

There's been no decision at

Therefore, the current state of the law allows

THE JUDGE:

Tell me the relevance of the, I know

5

the govenor made some, or not the governor rather, but the

6

attorney general made some proclamation.

7

MR. LUNDBERG:

They filed—

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MR. LUNDBERG:

Tell me what that's about.
Yes.

They filed an amecus brief

10

on behalf of the home owner in that case.

11

written a letter to Bank of America and began discussions

12

to try to work things out.

13

of America is going to take, if they are going to start

14

using an attorney licensed here to do their foreclosure

15

work.

16

They've also

I don't know what action Bank

However, currently there's nothing that prevents

17

ReconTrust from foreclosing.

18

point for a week, it was dissolved by Judge Waddoups.

19

that's been the state of the law for a year now.

20

There had been a TRO at one
And

There's no dispute that there was a default here

21

way back in early 2009.

The property was sold on May 17.

22

Notices to quit were served on June 1st.

23

haven't m a d e payments and have not vacated the p r o p e r t y .

24

Therefore w e would argue Fannie M a e should b e e n t i t l e d t o an

25

order of r e s t i t u t i o n .

The defendants
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1

THE JUDGE:

2

MR. HOLLAND:

Okay.
I think the Utah statutes are

3

extremely clear and as is that the bank act they claim to

4

have this authority under says as long as it's not in

5

contravension with Utah law.

6

are pointed out in Attorney General Shurtliff's letter to the

7

president of the Bank of America—

8
9

THE JUDGE:
law though.

MR. HOLLAND:

11

THE JUDGE:

12

MR. HOLLAND:

No, it isn?t the law.
Okay.
But it is, it is a specific

pointing out what the law is under the statute.

14
15

But that letter certainly isn't the

Right.

10

13

And those, both those points

THE JUDGE:

Has the house been resold?

Has the

house been resold?

16

MR. LUNDBERG:

It hasn't yet, Your Honor, because

17

Fannie Mae doesn't have possession of it yet.

18

in the home and that's what we are trying to get.

19

They are still

The arguments that have been made in the amecus

20

brief and the letter, those were made in front of

21

Judge Waddoups and he overruled them that, you know, the

22

National Banking Act preempts this.

23

that can be made.

24

effect, the state of the law is that ReconTrust can move

25

forward.

So there are claims

But until there's a ruling to that
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1
2

COURT'S RULING
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Ifm going to deny the motion

3

at this point to, to vacate the eviction and I will sign an

4

order of restitution when you have it prepared.

Okay?

5

MR. LUNDBERG:

I will prepare that, Your Honor.

6

MR. HOLLAND:

Now, how much time do we have for

7

the eviction?

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MR. HOLLAND:

10

MR. LUNDBERG:

11

THE JUDGE:

13

MR. HOLLAND:

14

THE JUDGE:

15

MR. HOLLAND:

16

THE JUDGE:

18

A week?
We could give them a week,

Your Honor.

12

17

How much time can you give them?

Okay.

We'll give them seven days.

And we'll have time for an appeal.
Absolutely.
Thank you.
You bet.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
=========================

9
0
1

4
5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

2
STATE OF UTAH
3

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

4
5
6
7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify

8

that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in

9

the matter of Federal Nat'1 Mortgage vs. Sundquist, hearing

10

date June 27, 2011, and that I transcribed it into

11

typewriting and that a full, true and correct transcription

12

of said hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in

13

the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 11, inclusive,

14

including where it is indicated that the recording was

15

inaudible.

16

•

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise

17

associated with any of the parties to this cause of action

18

and am not interested in the event thereof.

19
20

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 3rd day of
August, 2011.

21
22
23

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY
License 22-102811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12

24
25
0012
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FEDERAL N A T L MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
EVICTION HEARING

vs .
LORAINE SUNDQUIST Et a l ,
Defendant.

Case N o : 110408730 E V
MARK KOURIS
Judge:
June 2 7 , 2 011
Date:

Clerk:

rhondam

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) RICHARD J GUNNERSON
D e f e n d a n t ! s Attorney(s) J. KENT HOLLAND
Audio
Tape Number:
31
Tape Count: 8:54
ra
HEARING
Counsel for the defendant proffers and argues this case.
Plaintiff responds to the arguments. Court orders eviction to go
forward and an order of restitution to be issued within a week as
prayed.

>
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Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862)
Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 08168)
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
L&ACaseNo. 11-13010/KHE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,

ORDER OF RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
LORATNE SUNDQUIST and JOHN
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT,

Civil No. 110408730
Judge Bruce Lubeck

Defendants.

TO THE DEFENDANTS:
Within seven (7) days following the service of this Order of Restitution upon you, you must
vacate the premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, more particularly
described as follows:
Parcel 1:
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372.00 feet South from the Northeast corner of
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to the center of canal; thence
Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to
the point of beginning.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Parcel 1A:
Right of Way:
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West 3191.45
feet and South 512 feetfromthe Northeast corner of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road;
thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal and running thence South 6°30' East
along the center of canal the place of beginning.
Less and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Right-ofWay.
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-of-ways
appearing of record.
Also, within seven (7) days following the service of the Order of Restitution upon you, you
must remove your personal property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a Sheriff or Constable.
Pursuant to Section §78B-6-812 of the Utah Code, you are advised of your right to contest
the terms of this order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement. To do so you must file a
request for hearing within three (3) days after service of this order.
If you fail to comply with this Order of Restitution within seven (7) days following its
service upon you, the Sheriff or Constable may, at the direction of the plaintiff, enter the premises
by force using the least destructive means possible to remove you, your personal property, and any
persons claiming arightto occupancyfromyou.
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY:
Judgment was entered by the Court on the date below, for restitution to plaintiff of the
premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, more particularly described as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Parcel 1 :
Beginning at a point 3368.45 feet West and 372.00 feet Southfromthe Northeast corner of
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 129.00 feet; thence East 86 feet, more or less, to the center of canal; thence
Southeasterly along the center of said canal to a point due East of beginning; thence West to
the point of beginning.
Parcel 1A:
Right of Way:
Commencing at a point in the center of a 50 foot road and center of a canal; West 3191.45
feet and South 512 feetfromthe Northeast corner of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 177 feet along center of road;
thence North 140 feet; thence due East to center of canal and running thence South 6°30'
East along the center of canal the place of beginning.
Less and Excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Right-ofWay.
Subject to current general taxes, easements, restrictions, reservations and right-of-ways
appearing of record.
Therefore, you are commanded, as Sheriff or Constable, to restore to the plaintiff or its
representative, the premises located at 1599 East 12700 South, Draper, UT 84020, by removing the
defendants and any other unknown persons seven (7) days following service of this order. You are
hereby authorized to use appropriate force, if necessary, to restore said premises to the plaintiff.
DATED this

day of

, 2011.
BY THE COURT

District Court Judge
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Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862)
Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 08168)
Brigham Lundberg (USB No. 12583)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
L&ACaseNo. 11-13010/KHE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 110408730
LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT,
>

Judge Bruce Lubeck

Defendants.

I certify that on the /^ j day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
of Restitution was mailed by first class United States mail to:
J. Kent Holland
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 902278
Sandy, UT 84090-2278

John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant
1599 East 12700 South
Draper, UT 84020

^kfli^^

^Sfdho/j^ri
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( D LexisNexis®
1 of 2 DOCUMENTS
FRANCIS J. BEVILACQUA, THIRD vs. PABLO RODRIGUEZ.
SJC-10880
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2011 Mass. LEXIS 918
May 2,2011, Argued
October 18,2011, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Land Court
Department on April 12, 2010. The case was heard by
Keith C. Long, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an
application for direct appellate review.
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 18 LCR 451, 2010 Mass. LCR
LEXIS 90 (2010)

cient to show record title as required by Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 240, § 1. Furthermore, the purchaser could not claim
record title based on a theory that he was a bona fide
purchaser for value and without notice. The dismissal
should have been entered without prejudice, however,
because it was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

CASE SUMMARY:

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint, but remanded for entry of a dismissal without
prejudice.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff purchaser
brought an action to try title pursuant to Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 240, §§ 1-5. Respondent mortgagee was not
located and did not enter an appearance. The Land Court
(Massachusetts), on its own motion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the purchaser held no
title to the property and thus lacked standing to bring the
try title action. The purchaser appealed.

CORE TERMS: mortgage, deed, foreclosure, mortgagee, recorded, registry, bona fide purchaser, equity of
redemption, quitclaim deed, mortgagor, notice, adverse
claim, matter jurisdiction, ownership, foreclose, grantor,
power of sale, purchaser, assignee, chain, foreclosure
sale, recording, default, holder, purported, jurisdictional
facts, adverse claimants, jurisdictional, favorable, voidable

OVERVIEW: The mortgagee granted a mortgage on the
property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(MERS). Prior to assigning the mortgage, a bank executed a foreclosure deed purporting to transfer the
property from the bank to the bank as trustee under a
securitization servicing agreement. Nearly one month
later, MERS assigned the mortgage to the bank. A confirmatory foreclosure deed was later granted by the bank
to the bank as trustee under the servicing agreement.
Eight days later, the bank as trustee granted the quitclaim
deed to the purchaser. Although the purchaser was in
physical possession of the property when he filed the try
title action, he lacked standing because his chain of title
rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other
than the mortgagee or his successors. A single deed considered without reference to its chain of title was insuffi-

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Dismissals > General Overview
[HN1] Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), whenever it
appears by suggestion of a party or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers & Objections > Motions to Dismiss
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Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
General Overview
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure
[HN2] A court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's motion to dismiss under either Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or
(6). Ordinarily, in reviewing a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1) or (6), an appellate court accepts the factual
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, as well as any
favorable inferences reasonably drawn from them, as
true. The unusual mechanics of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
240, §§ 1-5, however, suggest that the analogy may not
be perfect and that a different standard may be appropriate in a try title action. If a plaintiff brings a try title action and the respondent defaults, the court shall enter a
decree that the respondent be forever barred from having
or enforcing any such claim adversely to the petitioner.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 2. As a result, a property
owner whose whereabouts are unknown and who is not
reached through publication notice might be divested by
a plaintiff who is put to no greater evidentiary test than
having pleaded facts that the court is obliged to accept as
true. But Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 4 provides remedies for those dispossessed by default judgment.

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > Limited Jurisdiction
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure
[HN3] Try title actions under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240,
§§ 1-5, are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Land Court. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 185, § 1(d). If the
petitioner cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements
of the statute, then the Land Court is without subject
matter jurisdiction and the petition must be dismissed.
The Land Court is a statutory court, not of general but of
strictly limited jurisdiction.

Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure
[HN4] See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § L

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview
Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure
[HN5] There are two steps to a try title action: the first,
which requires the plaintiff to establish jurisdictional
facts such that the adverse claimant might be summoned
to show cause why he should not bring an action to try
his claim, and the second, which requires the adverse
claimant either to disclaim the relevant interest in the
property or to bring an action to assert the claim in question. The establishment of jurisdictional facts, although

essential in all cases, is thus a matter of particular salience in the initial stage of a try title action. There appear to be two jurisdictional facts that must be shown to
establish standing under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 1.
First, it is clear on the face of the statute that only a person in possession of the disputed property may maintain
a try title action. Second, although less obviously clear, a
plaintiff must hold a record title to the land in question.

Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Elements of
Adverse Claims
[HN6] A disseisor is one who puts another out of the
possession of his lands wrongfully; a settled trespasser
on the land of another.

Real Property Law > Adverse Possession > Procedure
Real Property Law > Title Quality > Adverse Claim
Actions > Quiet Title Actions
[HN7] An action to quiet title is an in rem action, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 240, §10, brought under the court's equity
jurisdiction. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 185, § l(k). In equity,
the general doctrine is well settled that a bill to remove a
cloud from the land requires that both actual possession
and the legal title are united in the plaintiff. In contrast,
an action to try title is an action at law brought against
the respondent as an individual. Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
240, § 2. The court shall enter a decree that specified
adverse claimants be forever barred from having or enforcing any such claim adversely to the petitioner. The
distinction is critical because the plaintiff in a try title
action may defeat the specified adverse claims through a
default or by showing title that is merely superior to that
of the respondent. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 240, §§ 2-3. In
contrast, a quiet title action requires the plaintiff not
merely to demonstrate better title to the locus than the
defendants possess, but requires the plaintiff to prove
sufficient title to succeed in its action. Precedent applicable to one statute, although potentially persuasive, does
not control cases brought under the other statute.

Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Recording Acts
[HN8] There is nothing magical in the act of recording
an instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise
meaningless document with legal effect. The function of
a registry of deeds is to record documents. It is essentially a ministerial function. Recording may be necessary
to place the world on notice of certain transactions. Recording is not sufficient in and of itself, however, to
render an invalid document legally significant. As a result, it is the effectiveness of a document that is controlling rather than its mere existence. Accordingly, a single
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deed considered without reference to its chain of title is
insufficient to show record title as required by Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 240, § 1.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > Judicial Foreclosures
[HN9] Massachusetts adheres to the familiar rule that
one who sells under a power of sale must follow strictly
its terms so, where a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence of authority, there is no valid execution of the
power, and the sale is wholly void. One of the terms of
the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > General Overview
[HN10] Massachusetts is a title theory State in which a
mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to secure
a debt.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Formalities
[UN 11] It is possible for a foreclosure deed, ineffective
due to noncompliance with the power of sale, to nevertheless operate as an assignment of the mortgage itself.
The theory is that where a deed of real estate shows by
its language that it was intended to pass title by one form
of conveyance, by which however title could not pass,
courts have made the deed effective by construing it as a
deed of some other form, notwithstanding the inappropriateness of the language. Because an assignment of a
mortgage is a transfer of legal title, it becomes effective
only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before
the transfer.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Equitable Mortgages
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Redemption > Mortgagor's
Right
[HN12] In Massachusetts, a mortgage splits the title in
two parts: the legal title, which becomes the mortgagee's,
and the equitable title, which the mortgagor retains. The
purpose of the split is to give to the mortgagee an effectual security for the payment of a debt while leaving to
the mortgagor the full control, disposition and ownership
of the estate. The title held by a mortgagee is defeasible
and upon payment of the note by the mortgagor, the
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an end.
Inherent in this concept of the mortgagee's defeasible

title is the mortgagor's equity of redemption. The mortgagor's equity of redemption is the basic and historic
right of a debtor to redeem the mortgage obligation after
its due date, and ultimately to insist on foreclosure as the
means of terminating the mortgagor's interest in the
mortgaged real estate.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Redemption > Mortgagor's
Right
[HN13] An equity of redemption is inseparably connected with a mortgage, and endures so long as the
mortgage continues in existence. When the right of redemption is foreclosed, the mortgage has done its work
and the property is no longer mortgaged land. Instead,
the former mortgagee owns the legal and equitable interests in the property and the mortgage no longer exists.
Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 18, the mortgagor
holds the equity of redemption until the mortgagor forecloses. Upon payment of the note by the mortgagor, the
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an end.
Following default, therefore, a mortgagee may enter and
possess the property but his or her title remains subject to
the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 244, §§ 7, 2. This right of entry and possession distinguishes title and lien theory States. This state of affairs
persists until either the mortgagee brings a proceeding to
foreclose on the equity of redemption or until the mortgagor redeems the property and brings the mortgagee's
interests in the property to an end.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > General Overview
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Redemption > General Overview
[HN14] Foreclosure is the appropriate remedy for a
mortgagee seeking to resolve an outstanding equity of
redemption.

Real Property Law > Deeds > Types > Quit Claim
Deeds
Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona
Fide Purchasers
[HN15] In some States, one who has only a quitclaim
deed to land cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice. In Massachusetts, however, such a
deed is as effectual to transfer whatever title the grantor
has in the premises, as a deed with full covenants of
warranty. The conveyance in either form is voidable, and
not void, if fraudulent as to creditors; and, until defeated
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by a creditor, the title of the grantor passes. If a grantor
has voidable title to a Massachusetts property, therefore,
that title may pass through a quitclaim deed to a bona
fide purchaser in whose hands the title is no longer
voidable.

Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona
Fide Purchasers
[HN16] The law goes a great way in protecting the title
of a purchaser for value without notice or knowledge of
any defect in the power of the vendor to sell. For that
reason, the purchaser's title is not to be affected by mere
irregularities in executing a power of sale contained in a
mortgage, of which irregularities he has no knowledge,
actual or constructive. There are limits to the protections
provided to bona fide purchasers, however, and the purchaser of an apparently perfect record title is not protected against all adverse claims. Where the bona fide
purchaser is not protected against an adverse claim the
purchaser must rely upon the covenants of his deed rather than dispossession of the true owner - that is, there
are situations in which it is the purchaser rather than the
original owner who must seek recovery from a third
person rather than being awarded possession of the
property itself. Generally, the key question in this regard
is whether the transaction is void, in which case it is a
nullity such that title never left possession of the original
owner, or merely voidable in which case a bona fide
purchaser may take good title.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Foreclosures > General Overview
Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other
Security Instruments > Formalities
[HN17] Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking jurisdiction and authority to carry out a foreclosure under the
relevant statutes is void.

Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Bona
Fide Purchasers
[HN18] Parties may not establish themselves as bona
fide purchasers simply by claiming that they were blissfully unaware of facts to which they closed their eyes.

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > General
Overview
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview
[HN19] The issue of standing is one of subject matter
jurisdiction.

Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Dismissals > General Overview
[HN20] A complaint that is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits. Mass. R. Civ.
P. 41(b)(3). It is thus inappropriate to attach preclusive
effects to the dismissal beyond the matter actually decided - the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
HEADNOTES
Jurisdiction, Land Court. Land Court, Jurisdiction.
Practice, Civil, Parties, Standing, Dismissal. Real Property, Ownership, Record title, Mortgage, Bona fide purchaser. Mortgage, Real estate, Foreclosure, Assignment,
Equity of redemption.
COUNSEL: Jeffrey B. Loeb (David Glod with him) for
the plaintiff.
Richard A. Oetheimer (Natalie F. Langlois with him) for
Mortgage Bankers Association.
Max Weinstein for WilmerHale Legal Services Center of
Harvard Law School.
John M. Stephan & Amber Anderson Villa, Assistant
Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Mark B.
Johnson for American Land Title Association.
Adam J. Levitin, of the District of Columbia, Christopher
L. Peterson, of Utah, John A.E. Pottow, of Michigan, &
Katherine Porter, Pro se.
Edward Rainen, Carrie B. Rainen, & Ward P. Graham
for Massachusetts Association of Bank Counsel, Inc.
JUDGES: Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford,
Gants, & Duffly, JJ.
OPINION BY: SPINA
OPINION
SPINA, J. In this case we must determine whether a
plaintiff has standing to maintain a try title action under
G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, where he is in physical possession
of real property but his chain of title rests on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other than "the mortgagee or [*2] his executors, administrators, successors or
assigns." G. L. c. 183, §21 (statutory power of sale). See
G. L. c. 244, § 14 (procedure for foreclosure under power
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of sale). On his own motion, a Land Court judge determined that the plaintiff, Francis J. Bevilacqua, III, "holds
no title to the property at 126-128 Summer Street in Haverhill," and thus lacks standing to bring a try title action.
The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice and
Bevilacqua appealed. We granted Bevilacqua's application for direct appellate review and now affirm the dismissal of his complaint but conclude that such dismissal
should have been entered without prejudice.1
1 We gratefully acknowledge the amicus briefs
submitted by the American Land Title Association; the Attorney General of the Commonwealth;
the Massachusetts Association of Bank Counsel,
Inc.; the Mortgage Bankers Association; Professors Adam J. Levitin, Christopher L. Peterson,
Katherine Porter, and John A.E. Pottow; and the
WilmerHale Legal Services Center of Harvard
Law School.
1. Procedural background. This case comes before
us on a highly unusual procedural footing. The respondent, Pablo Rodriguez, has not been located and accordingly has [*3] not entered an appearance. As a result,
it fell to the Land Court judge to raise the issue of Bevilacqua's standing under G. L. c. 240, § 1. See [HN1]
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)
("Whenever it appears by suggestion of a party or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action"); Maxwell v. AIG
Domestic Claims, Inc., ante 91, 99-100 (2011); Sullivan
v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court,
448 Mass. 15, 21, 858 N.E.2d 699 (2006); Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass.
619, 622, 420 N.E.2d 339 (1981). The procedures applicable to such a sua sponte motion in a try title action are
unclear and the judge did not specify the rule under
which the dismissal was ordered. We have received no
briefing on the issue from Bevilacqua, and those amici
addressing the point note that the absence of precedent
leads them to ffpresume[]" the applicable standard.
In considering the appropriate procedure, we note
that [HN2] a court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's motion to dismiss under either Mass. R. Civ. P. 12
(b) (1) or (6)9 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Ordinarily, "[i]n
reviewing [*4] a dismissal under rule 12 (b) (1) or (6),
we accept the factual allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, as well as any favorable inferences reasonably
drawn from them, as true." Ginther v. Commissioner of
Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322, 693 N.E.2d 153 (1998). Cf.
lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888
N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007) (clarifying standards for dismissal under rule 12

[b] [6]). The unusual mechanics of G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5,
however, suggest that the analogy may not be perfect and
that a different standard may be appropriate.2 We need
not resolve the issue today, however, because we conclude that Bevilacqua's complaint must be dismissed
even if we apply the most favorable of the possible standards of review. See Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins.,
supra (standards for motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). We thus "accept the factual allegations in [Bevilacqua's petition], as well as any favorable
inferences reasonably drawn from them, as true." Id.
Those facts are as follows.
2 It may not be desirable merely to assume the
accuracy of a plaintiffs's factual assertions. If a
plaintiff brings a try title action and the respondent [*5] defaults, "the court shall enter a decree
that [the respondent] be forever barred from having or enforcing any such claim adversely to the
petitioner." G. L. c. 240, § 2. As a result, a property owner whose whereabouts are unknown and
who is not reached through publication notice
might be divested by a plaintiff who is put to no
greater evidentiary test than having pleaded facts
that the court is obliged to accept as true. See
Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319,
322, 693 N.E.2dl53 (1998). But see G L. c. 240,
§ 4 (remedies for those dispossessed by default
judgment). Here, for instance, there are no recorded instruments in evidence and Bevilacqua
merely has alleged their existence and contents.
A better approach, consistent with the procedure followed in the case of a motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
may be to place the burden of proof on the nonmoving party (here, Bevilacqua) to prove jurisdictional facts. See, e.g., Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441
Mass. 487, 491, 806 KE.2d 415 (2004). As discussed further, infra at
, the existence of
record title is a requirement for standing under G.
L. c. 240, § 7, and thus a jurisdictional fact. That
said, application of a preponderance [*6] of the
evidence standard may be inappropriate at this
stage of a try title proceeding if it is indistinguishable from "the question whether [the plaintiff] has a better title [than the respondent]" - a
matter that "is not to be determined in these proceedings, but in the actions which the respondents may be ordered to bring" as a result of the
try title action. Blanchard v. Lowell, 177 Mass.
501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114 (1901). Given these
difficulties, it may be necessary to adopt a unique
standard of review in future try title actions.
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On March 18, 2005, Pablo Rodriguez granted a
mortgage on the property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for Finance
America, LLC. The mortgage was recorded at the
Southern Essex registry of deeds (registry). As of June
29, 2006, MERS had not assigned the mortgage to U.S.
Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) but, on that date,
U.S. Bank executed a foreclosure deed referencing the
mortgage and purporting to transfer the property pursuant to a foreclosure sale from U.S. Bank (as trustee
under a trust that is not further described) to U.S. Bank
"as Trustee under the securitization Servicing Agreement
dated as of July 1, 2005 Structured [*7] Asset Securities Corporation Structure Asset Investment Loan Trust
Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-HEI."
Nearly one month later, on July 21, 2006, MERS assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank in an assignment of
mortgage recorded at the registry. A "confirmatory foreclosure deed" was then granted on October 9, 2006, by
U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing
agreement. Eight days later, on October 17, 2006, U.S.
Bank "as Trustee" granted a quitclaim deed to Bevilacqua.
On April 12, 2010, Bevilacqua filed a petition to
compel Rodriguez to try title to the property. In his complaint Bevilacqua claimed to reside at the property and to
hold record title. Because of the fact that MERS had not
assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank at the time of the
foreclosure, Bevilacqua alleged that there is a cloud on
his title in the form of "the possibility of an adverse
claim by Rodriguez against Bevilacqua's title to the
[property."
2. Statutory background. Bevilacqua seeks an order
that either compels Rodriguez to bring an action to try
his title or forever bars him from enforcing his adverse
claims to the property. [HNS] Try title actions under G
L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, are within the [*8] exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Land Court. G. L. c. 185, § 1 (d). If
Bevilacqua cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements
of the statute, then the Land Court is without subject
matter jurisdiction and the petition must be dismissed.
See Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth,
374 Mass. 37, 46, 371 N.E.2d 728 (1977); Riverbank
Improvement Co. v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 424, 425, 113
N.E. 215 (1916) ("The Land Court is a statutory court,
not of general but of strictly limited jurisdiction").
The statute states, in relevant part:
[HN4] "If the record title of land is
clouded by an adverse claim, or by the
possibility thereof, a person in possession
of such land claiming an estate of freehold
therein . . . may file a petition in the land
court stating his interest, describing the

land, the claims and the possible adverse
claimants so far as known to him, and
praying that such claimants may be summoned to show cause why they should not
bring an action to try such claim."

G. L. c. 240, § 1. [HN5] There are thus two steps to a try
title action: the first, which requires the plaintiff to establish jurisdictional facts such that the adverse claimant
might be "summoned to show cause why [he] should not
bring an action [*9] to try [his] claim," and the second,
which requires the adverse claimant either to disclaim
the relevant interest in the property or to bring an action
to assert the claim in question.3 Id. See Blanchard v. Lowell, 177 Mass. 501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114 (1901). The
establishment of jurisdictional facts, although essential in
all cases, is thus a matter of particular salience in the
initial stage of a try title action.
3 As discussed further, infra, the structure of
the try title statute is a direct reflection of the limitations inherent in the common-law writ of entry. The try title statute may now be something of
an anachronism when it is considered that modern statutes are far more flexible than the common-law writ, see G. L. c. 237; that Massachusetts courts are now vested with equity jurisdiction, see, e.g., G. L. c. 185, § l(k)\ and that declaratory judgment is now available to litigants in
this Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 231A inserted
by St. 1945, c. 582, § 1 .
There appear to be two jurisdictional facts that must
be shown to establish standing under G. L. c. 240, § 1.
First, it is clear on the face of the statute that only "a
person in possession" of the disputed property may
maintain a try title [*10] action. Id. Second, although
less obviously clear, a plaintiff must hold a "record title"
to the land in question. Blanchard v. Lowell, supra at
504. Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 440-441, 38 N.E.
1132 (1894). Here, Bevilacqua has alleged that he resides on the property, a factual assertion that we accept
as true and from which we draw the favorable inference
that he is "a person in possession" as required by G L. c.
240, § 7.4 Bevilacqua also claims to hold record title to
the property as required to support standing. See Blanchard v. Lowell, supra. In dismissing the petition the
judge concluded that the facts alleged by Bevilacqua did
not support his claim of record title and that, as a result,
Bevilacqua lacked standing. This is the controversy presented on appeal.
4 One of the amici has appended to its brief a
number of deeds referring to the property at
126-128 Summer Street in Haverhill that were
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recorded between the time Bevilacqua purchased
the property and the date on which he filed his
petition. Specifically, Bevilacqua recorded a
master deed establishing a condominium that
consists of four units. Bevilacqua also recorded
three deeds transferring units to various
third-party purchasers. [*11] These deeds and
the conveyances they represent are not matters
properly before the court and do not factor into
our analysis. Although nonevidentiary, the deeds
are nevertheless noteworthy in that they explain
why Bevilacqua's complaint is drafted to imply
possession rather than pleading the matter directly, see Connolley, petitioner, 168 Mass. 201, 203,
46 N.E. 618 (1897) ("the only question . . . is
whether the petitioner has a record title to the
whole estate"), and in that they highlight the
concerns addressed, see note 2, supra, regarding
the proper standards of review and evidentiary
burdens in a try title action.
Before analyzing whether Bevilacqua has demonstrated the existence of record title, and in light of the
fact that it has been more than a century since this court
last examined standing under G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, we
first consider the history and purposes of the statute.5 The
initial try title statute was enacted in 1851 and provided:
"Any person in possession of real
property, claiming an estate of freehold . .
. may file a petition in the supreme judicial court, setting forth his estate . . . and
averring that he is credibly informed and
believes, that the respondent makes some
[*12] claim adverse to the estate of the
petitioner, and praying that he may be
summoned to show cause, why he should
not bring an action to try the alleged title,
if any." St 1851, c. 233, § 66.

Prior to enactment of this statute, the principal means of
trying title to land was the writ of entry, which permitted
a plaintiff to "obtain possession of real estate from a disseisor who is in possession and holds the demandant
out." Meadv. Cutler, 208 Mass. 391, 392, 94 N.E. 478
(1911). See Black's Law Dictionary 472 (6th ed. 1990)
([HN6] disseisor is "[o]ne who puts another out of the
possession of his lands wrongfully. A settled trespasser
on the land of another"). See also Black's Law Dictionary
541 (9th ed. 2009). The writ was limited, however, by
the fact that it could only be brought where the plaintiff
was "held out." See Mead v. Cutler, supra. As a result,
there were "cases where a party in possession of real
estate would be obliged to abandon his accustomed possession and use, in order to [bring a writ of entry and] try

the right of an adverse claimant." Munroe v. Ward, 86
Mass. 150, 4 Allen 150, 151 (1862). In recognition of the
fact that such abandonment "would be unreasonable and
contrary to sound policy," the try [*13] title statute was
enacted so that property owners might remain in possession while requiring that adverse claims be either asserted or disavowed rather than lingering indefinitely. Id.
5 In determining that a plaintiff under G. L. c.
240, §§ 1-5, must possess both record title and
possession, the motion judge quoted Daley v.
Daley, 300 Mass. 17, 21, 14 N.E.2d 113 (1938),
to the effect that "[a] petition to remove a cloud
from the title to land affected cannot be maintained unless both actual possession and the legal
title are united in the petitioner." The Daley case
is inapposite, however, because it involves a bill
to quiet title pursuant to G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10, rather than an action to try title pursuant to G. L. c.
240, §§ 1-5. See generally R.W. Bishop, Prima
Facie Case § 48.5, at 601-602 (5th ed. 2005) (intermingling discussion of both try title and quiet
title cases in section entitled "Actions to Try
Title").
[HN7] An action to quiet title is an in rem
action, G. L. c. 240, §10, brought under the
court's equity jurisdiction. See G. L. c. 185, §
l(k); First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper,
191 Mass. 196, 209, 77 N.E. 778 (1906) ("in equity the general doctrine is well settled, that a bill
to remove a cloud [*14] from the land . . . [requires that] both actual possession and the legal
title are united in the plaintiff). In contrast, an
action to try title is an action at law brought
against the respondent as an individual. See G. L.
c. 240, § 2 ("the court shall enter a decree that
[specified adverse claimants] be forever barred
from having or enforcing any such claim adversely to the petitioner"); Clouston v. Shearer,
99 Mass. 209, 211, 212-213 (1868) (at time try
title statute was enacted in 1851, Massachusetts
courts did not yet possess general equity jurisdiction that would permit actions to remove cloud
from title [not until 1852]).
The distinction is critical because the plaintiff in a try title action may defeat the specified
adverse claims through a default or by showing
title that is merely superior to that of the respondent. See G. L. c. 240, §§ 2-3; Blanchard v. Lowell, 177 Mass. 501, 504-505, 59 N.E. 114
(1901). In contrast, a quiet title action requires
the plaintiff "not merely to demonstrate better
title to the locus than the defendants possess, but
requires the plaintiff to prove sufficient title to
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succeed in its action." Sheriffs Meadow Found.,
Inc. v. Bay-Courte Edgartown, Inc., 401 Mass.
267, 269, 516 N.K2d 144 (1987). [*15] See
U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637,
645, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011); Loring v. Hildreth,
170 Mass. 328, 49 N.E. 652 (1898). Precedent
applicable to one statute, although potentially
persuasive, does not control cases brought under
the other statute.
Under the early versions of the try title statute the
sole jurisdictional requirement was "actual possession
and taking of profits" from the land. Id. at 152. See St.
1873, c. 178; St. 1852, c. 312, § 52; St. 1851, c. 233, §
66. Pursuant to these statutes, record or legal title to the
property was irrelevant. See Orthodox Congregational
Soc'y v. Greenwich, 145 Mass. 112, 113, 13 N.E. 380
(1887) ("[M]ost of the facts. . . bear only upon the question of title. These we need not consider"); Leary v. Duff,
137 Mass. 147, 149-150 (1884) ("not of importance that
the title asserted by the petitioner rests upon an alleged ..
. adverse possession," rather than on legal title).
These early enactments were repealed in 1893,
however, and the modern form of the statute was
adopted. St. 1893, c. 340. One of the principal amendments was the addition of an opening clause, referring to
"the record title of real property." St. 1893, c. 340, § 1.
Contrast Pub. Sts. (1882), c. 176, §§ 1, [*16] 2. Almost
immediately following the 1893 amendment, this court
was required to consider the meaning of the new statutory language. In the case of Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass.
438, 38 N.E. 1132 (1894), a putative property owner
filed a try title action alleging possession and relying on
a recorded deed purporting to convey good title to the
property. Id. at 439-440. The court held that mere possession was no longer sufficient and that, under the new
statute, title appearing on "the record" was also necessary.6 Id at 440. The court thus read the new introductory clause as limiting the types of disputes - i.e., only
claims based on record title ~ that might be resolved in a
try title action. See St 1893, c. 340, § 1 ("When the
record title of real property is clouded by an adverse
claim"). The limitation added by the Legislature in 1893
remains operative in the present statute and the jurisdictional requirement of "record title" is thus applicable to
Bevilacqua's claim. Compare G. L. c. 240, § 1 ("If the
record title of land is clouded by an adverse claim . . ."),
with St. 1893, c. 340, § 1. We turn, then, to consider Bevilacqua's various claims to record title.
6 Interestingly for purposes of this [*17] proceeding, in Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 38
N.E. 1132 (1894), the court was presented with a
try title action where the plaintiff relied on a recorded deed reciting that the grantor possessed

good title. Id. at 440. "[T]he recitals [were] not
true [however], and this would appear by an examination of the records of the Probate Court."
Id. Accordingly, the mere recording of an instrument with the registry of deeds that purports to
transfer ownership was insufficient to create
standing under the try title statute. Id. But see
Connolley, petitioner, 168 Mass. 201, 203-204,
46 N.E. 618 (1897) (petitioner had sufficient
record title where his grantor had only 255/264th
ownership according to registry records, 246/264
th ownership according to wills and registry
records, and complete but unrecorded ownership
due to adverse possession).
3. Standing as owner of the property.7 Bevilacqua
alleges that he has record title to the property because he
is the owner by virtue of a quitclaim deed granted to him
by U.S. Bank. There appear to be two theories that underpin this argument. First, the quitclaim deed may be
sufficient by itself to support record title to the property.
Second, if the quitclaim deed itself does not [*18] constitute record title, then that instrument coupled with the
chain of grants on which it relies is sufficient as a whole
to demonstrate record title. The first theory is incorrect
as a matter of law. The second theory is unpersuasive in
light of the facts alleged by Bevilacqua.
7 We refer in Part 3 to Bevilacqua as the owner
of the property, using the term "owner" in a colloquial sense, to distinguish this analysis from
our later consideration of Bevilacqua's claim to
hold record title as assignee of the mortgage or as
a bona fide purchaser without notice.
In addressing the first theory, that a single recorded
deed purporting to transfer title is sufficient to establish
record title, the Land Court judge made the trenchant
observation that such a doctrine would render the
"Brooklyn Bridge" problem insoluble. Specifically, the
judge wrote that "in the classic example, a litigant could
go to the registry, record a deed to the Brooklyn Bridge,
commence suit, hope that the true owners ignored the
suit or . . . could not be readily located and [would thus]
be defaulted, and secure a judgment." Leaving aside the
fact that public property cannot be the subject of a try
title action, see G. L. c. 240, § 5, [*19] an interpretation
of the try title statute permitting such a result cannot be
the law.
We are not persuaded by this "single deed" theory
for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that
[HN8] there is nothing magical in the act of recording an
instrument with the registry that invests an otherwise
meaningless document with legal effect. See S & H Petroleum Corp. v. Register of Deeds for the County of
Bristol, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 537, 707 N.E.2d 843
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(1999) ("The function of a registry of deeds is to record
documents. It is essentially a ministerial function . . .").
Recording may be necessary to place the world on notice
of certain transactions. See, e.g., G. L. c. 183, § 4 (leases
and deed); G. L. c. 203, §§ 2-3 (trust documents). Recording is not sufficient in and of itself, however, to
render an invalid document legally significant. See Arnold v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 440, 38 N.E. 1132 (1894);
Nickerson v. Loud, 115 Mass. 94, 97-98 (1874) ("mere
assertions . . . whether recorded or unrecorded, do not
constitute a cloud upon title, against which equity will
grant relief). As a result, it is the effectiveness of a
document that is controlling rather than its mere existence. See Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15, 793
N.E.2d 335 (2003) [*20] (where grantor lacks title "a
mutual intent to convey and receive title to the property
is beside the point"). The effectiveness of the quitclaim
deed to Bevilacqua thus turns, in part, on the validity of
his grantor's title. Accordingly, a single deed considered
without reference to its chain of title is insufficient to
show "record title" as required by G. L. c. 240, § 1.
The second theory supporting Bevilacqua's ownership claim addresses this point by asserting that the chain
of deeds recorded at the registry is sufficient to demonstrate record title. Under this theory Bevilacqua may
trace his chain of title back from the quitclaim deed,
through the foreclosure deed, and ultimately to the
mortgage granted by Rodriguez to MERS as nominee for
Finance America. Bevilacqua has alleged, however, that
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the
time that it purported to foreclose on the property and
conduct a sale pursuant to the power of sale contained in
the mortgage.8
8 One amicus appended to its brief a copy of
the foreclosure deed and the legal notice announcing the foreclosure sale. That foreclosure
deed recites that "U.S. Bank National Association
[U.S. Bank] as Trustee [is [*21 ] the] holder of a
mortgage from Pablo Rodriguez" while the notice, recorded with the foreclosure deed, states
that "[U.S. Bank as trustee] is the present holder"
of the mortgage. Neither of these documents is in
evidence and, whether he relied on such representations or not, Bevilacqua's petition directly
contradicts the accuracy of the quoted statements.
We rely on the facts pleaded in the petition for
purposes of this appeal. See supra at
As we recently held in the Ibanez case, [HN9] Massachusetts "adherefs] to the familiar rule that 'one who
sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its
terms'" so, where a foreclosure sale occurs in the absence
of authority, "there is no valid execution of the power,
and the sale is wholly void." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.

Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011),
quoting Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211, 72 N.E. 967
(1905). "One of the terms of the power of sale that must
be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is entitled
to foreclose." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at
647. See Bongaards v. Millen, supra. By alleging that
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the
time of the purported foreclosure, Bevilacqua is necessarily [*22] asserting that the power of sale was not
complied with, that the purported sale was invalid, and
that his grantor's title was defective. See U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra. In light of its defective title, the
intention of U.S. Bank to transfer the property to Bevilacqua is irrelevant and he cannot have become the owner of the property pursuant to the quitclaim deed. See
Bongaards v. Millen, supra. Bevilacqua's theory based
on the chain of title is thus unpersuasive.
In this regard we note that Bevilacqua's try title action based on ownership of the property faces an insurmountable obstacle. A try title action may be brought
only where record title is "clouded by an adverse claim,
or by the possibility thereof." G. L. c. 240, § L However,
the very fact that raises the possibility of an adverse
claim - U.S. Bank's lack of authority to foreclose at the
time it purported to foreclose ~ is fatal to Bevilacqua's
claim to "own" the property. The basic problem is that,
instead of presenting a potentially viable claim and
seeking to test it against the claims of a rival, Bevilacqua
effectively admits that he does not presently have record
title and seeks a declaration, if Rodriguez [*23] were to
default, that the defect is cured. In light of the pleaded
facts it is thus impossible for us to conclude that Bevilacqua's ownership theory demonstrates the jurisdictional
facts necessary to maintain a try title action. See G. L. c.
240, § 1.
4. Standing as assignee of the mortgage. As an alternative to the claim that he owns the property in fee
simple, Bevilacqua argues that he holds record title because he is the assignee of the mortgage granted by Rodriguez to MERS as nominee for Finance America. Bevilacqua does not develop the argument at length but it is
an intriguing one given that [HN10] Massachusetts is a
"title theory" State in which "a mortgage is a transfer of
legal title in a property to secure a debt." U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at 649. If a mortgagee's legal title
suffices to establish "record title" under G L. c. 240, § 7,
then Bevilacqua may be able to demonstrate standing to
proceed with this try title action. We conclude, however,
that Bevilacqua's claim to record title as mortgagee is
inconsistent with the relief he seeks, namely, that Rodriguez be compelled either to "show cause why he should
not be required to bring an action to try title" or to "be
[*24] forever barred from having or enforcing any claim
in the property." Accordingly, we conclude that Bevi-
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lacqua's theory of record title as mortgagee is untenable
and cannot support standing under G L. c. 240, § 1.
We begin our analysis of this question by noting that
Bevilacqua's claim to be holder of the mortgage has at
least a plausible basis despite the fact that he has never
taken an express assignment. This court has held that
[HN11] it is possible for a foreclosure deed, ineffective
due to noncompliance with the power of sale, to nevertheless operate as an assignment of the mortgage itself.
See Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co., 142 Mass. 590, 591, 8
N.E. 646 (1886); Dearnaley v. Chase, 136 Mass. 288,
290 (1884); Brown v. Smith, 116 Mass. 108 (1874). The
theory is that "where a deed of real estate shows by its
language that it was intended to pass title by one form of
conveyance, by which however title could not pass,
courts have made the deed effective by construing it as a
deed of some other form, notwithstanding the inappropriateness of the language." Kaufman v. Federal Nat'l
Bank, 287 Mass. 97, 100-101, 191 N.E. 422 (1934). Bevilacqua argues in his brief that "the foreclosure deed
constituted an assignment of the [*25] mortgage on the
[property to Bevilacqua." As stated, this proposition
cannot be correct because Bevilacqua was not a party to
the foreclosure deed. Further, Bevilacqua has alleged that
U.S. Bank was not the assignee of the mortgage at the
time it executed the foreclosure deed so it is impossible
for that instrument to be construed as an assignment of
mortgage. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, supra at
654 ("Because an assignment of a mortgage is a transfer
of legal title, it becomes effective . . . only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before the transfer"). We
assume without deciding, however, that Bevilacqua
might be able to establish a chain of assignments passing
from his quitclaim deed, through the "Confirmatory Foreclosure Deed," through the recorded assignment from
MERS, and thus ultimately back to Rodriguez's original
deed of mortgage. See supra at [2-3] (regarding drawing
of favorable inferences). We may thus assume, without
deciding, that there is a factual basis on which Bevilacqua may claim to be the assignee of the mortgage.
The title that Bevilacqua might claim as mortgagee,
however, would be inconsistent with the relief that might
be provided under G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5. [*26] The problem, from Bevilacqua's perspective, arises from the nature of a mortgage. [HN12] In Massachusetts, a "mortgage splits the title in two parts: the legal title, which
becomes the mortgagee's, and the equitable title, which
the mortgagor retains." Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge.
Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 90, 557 N.E.2d 756 (1990).
The purpose of the split is "to give to the mortgagee an
effectual security for the payment of a debt [while]
leav[ing] to the mortgagor . . . the full control, disposition and ownership of the estate." Santiago v. Alba Mgt.,
77 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 49, 928 N.E.2d 359 (2010), quot-

ing Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank v. White, 30 F.
Supp. 416, 418-419 (D. Mass. 1939). The title held by a
mortgagee is defeasible and "upon payment of the note
by the mortgagor . . . the mortgagee's interest in the real
property comes to an end." Maglione v. BancBoston
Mtge. Corp., supra.
Inherent in this concept of the mortgagee's defeasible title is the mortgagor's equity of redemption:
"[T]he mortgagor's equity of redemption [is] the basic and historic right of a
debtor to redeem the mortgage obligation
after its due date, and ultimately to insist
on foreclosure as the means of terminating the mortgagor's [*27] interest in the
mortgaged real estate."

Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) c. 3, Introductory Note at 97 (1996) (addressing common law applicable in both title theory and lien theory States).
[HN13] "[A]n equity of redemption is inseparably connected with a mortgage," Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332,
337, 24 L. Ed. 775 (1877), and endures so long as the
mortgage continues in existence:
"When the right of redemption is foreclosed, the mortgage has done its work
and the property is no longer mortgaged
land. Instead, the former mortgagee owns
the legal and equitable interests in the
property and the mortgage no longer exists."

Santiago v. Alba Mgt., supra at 50. See G. L. c. 244, § 18
(mortgagor holds equity of redemption until mortgagor
forecloses); Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. Corp., supra
("upon payment of the note by the mortgagor . . . the
mortgagee's interest in the real property comes to an
end"). Following default, therefore, a mortgagee may
enter and possess the property but his or her title remains
subject to the mortgagor's equity of redemption. See G.
L c. 244, §§1,2; Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 322 Mass.
46, 52-53, 76 N.E.2d 169 & n.l (1947); Maglione v.
BancBoston Mtge. Corp., supra at 91 (this right [*28]
of entry and possession distinguishes title and lien theory
States). This state of affairs persists until either the
mortgagee brings a proceeding to foreclose on the equity
of redemption, see Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199,
205 n.4, 366N.E.2d241 (1977) (listing four methods of
foreclosing equity of redemption), or until the mortgagor
redeems the property and brings the mortgagee's interests
in the property to an end. See Maglione v. BancBoston
Mtge. Corp., supra at 90. See also G. L. c. 260, § 33 (limitations period for foreclosure proceedings). The cru-
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cial point is that a mortgage, by its nature, necessarily
implies the simultaneous existence of two separate but
complementary claims to the property that do not survive
the mortgage or each other.
This point controls the present case because a litigant who asserts that he or she is the holder of a mortgage necessarily asserts that the mortgage continues to
exist and that the mortgagor's claims to the property remain valid. For this reason, a plaintiff in a try title action
may be heard to claim that a mortgage no longer exists,
that claims to the contrary are adverse, and that the putative mortgagee should be required to bring an action trying the [*29] claim. See, e.g., Brewster v. Seeger, 173
Mass. 281, 53 N.E. 814 (1899). For a plaintiff to both
claim record title as holder of a mortgage and to dispute
the respondent's continuing equitable title or equity of
redemption would be oxymoronic, however, because the
only circumstances in which the respondent's rights
would not be upheld are circumstances in which there is
no mortgage for the plaintiff to hold. This is the circumstance in which Bevilacqua finds himself.
To assert that he holds legal title as mortgagee, Bevilacqua must necessarily accept that Rodriguez has a
complementary claim to either equitable title (if there has
been no default) or an equity of redemption (if default
has occurred). In either case, and although their economic interests may diverge, Bevilacqua cannot be heard to
argue that Rodriguez's claim is adverse to his own. This
fact necessarily precluded Bevilacqua from establishing
a necessary element of his try title action - the existence
of an adverse claim.9 See G. L. c. 240, § 1 (action may be
brought "[i]f the record title of land is clouded by an adverse claim . . ."). The legal title possessed by a mortgagee is not, therefore, a basis of standing that would be
consistent [*30] with maintenance of Bevilacqua's action against Rodriguez. Accordingly, we conclude that it
is not open to Bevilacqua to rely on such title in attempting to demonstrate the necessary jurisdictional
facts.10
9 In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine what kind of action Rodriguez might
bring to try his title as mortgagor. Presumably
Rodriguez would assert that the purported foreclosure sale was ineffective, that no foreclosure
has occurred, and that he thus retains an equity of
redemption. Bevilacqua necessarily would agree
with these claims, having asserted that he is the
mortgage holder, so judgment could enter on the
pleadings declaring that Rodriguez enjoys an equity of redemption. Such an action would be
nonsensical.
10 Bevilacqua asserts that foreclosure is not an
adequate remedy in these circumstances because,

he argues with emphasis, if he "is required to foreclose on the mortgage . . . to clean up his title,
this will delay his sale or refinance for a minimum of about seven to nine months." [HN14]
Foreclosure, however, is the appropriate remedy
for a mortgagee seeking to resolve an outstanding
equity of redemption. See Negron v. Gordon, 373
Mass. 199, 205 n.4, 366 N.E.2d 241 (1977)
[*31] (listing four methods of foreclosing equity
of redemption). Nothing contained herein is intended to limit Bevilacqua's right, if he can show
himself to be mortgagee of the property, to pursue foreclosure under the appropriate statutes.
The record does not disclose if Bevilacqua presently holds the promissory note secured by Rodriguez's mortgage. Whether the holder of a
mortgage may foreclose the equity of redemption
without also holding the note is a question that is
not before us.
5. Standing as bona fide purchaser for value. In concluding his arguments, Bevilacqua asserts that he "could
not have known, when he purchased the [p]roperty, that
this title problem existed" and that as a result he must be
permitted to proceed under the try title statute or be left
without an adequate remedy. Certain of the amici expand
on this point, arguing that Bevilacqua is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice such that he holds
good title to the property. Under this theory, Bevilacqua's
quitclaim deed transferred good title to the property that,
in addition to his possession, satisfies the standing requirements of the try title statute.11 G L. c. 240, § 1. We
need not address the legal [*32] merits of the argument
because Bevilacqua is not a bona fide purchaser without
notice of the defects in his grantor's title.
11 Bevilacqua's chain of title as a bona fide
purchaser necessarily begins with his quitclaim
deed from U.S. Bank. [HN15] In some States,
"[i]t is well settled . . . that one who has only a
quitclaim deed to land cannot claim protection as
a bona fide purchaser without notice." Polhemus
v. Cobb, 653 So. 2d 964, 967-968 (Ala. 1995),
quoting Gordon v. Ward, 221 Ala. 173, 174, 128
So. 217 (1930). "In this Commonwealth, [however,] such a deed is as effectual to transfer
whatever title the grantor has in the premises, as a
deed with full covenants of warranty. The conveyance in either form is voidable, and not void,
if fraudulent as to creditors; and, until defeated by
a creditor, the title of the grantor passes." Mansfield v. Dyer, 131 Mass. 200, 201 (1881). See
Boynton v. Haggart, 120 F. 819, 822-823 (8th
Cir. 1903) (history and evolution of decisions regarding quitclaim deeds, recording statutes, and
bona fide purchasers). If a grantor has voidable
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title to a Massachusetts property, therefore, that
title may pass through a quitclaim deed to a bona
fide purchaser in whose hands the title [*33] is
no longer voidable.
We begin analysis of this bona fide purchaser theory
by noting that [HN16] "[t]he law goes a great way in
protecting the title of a purchaser for value without notice or knowledge of any defect in the power of the vendor to sell . . . ." Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 183,
47N.E. 602 (1897). For that reason, the purchaser's "title
is not to be affected by mere irregularities in executing a
power of sale contained in a mortgage, of which irregularities he has no knowledge, actual or constructive." Id.
at 183-184. There are limits to the protections provided
to bona fide purchasers, however, and "[t]he purchaser of
an apparently perfect record title is not protected against
all adverse claims." Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14,
17, 126 N.E. 271 (1920). Where the bona fide purchaser
is not protected against an adverse claim the purchaser
"must rely upon the covenants of his deed" rather than
dispossession of the true owner ~ that is, there are situations in which it is the purchaser rather than the original
owner who must seek recovery from a third person rather
than being awarded possession of the property itself. Id.
See 3 J. Palomar, Land Titles § 677, at 374-375 (3d ed.
2003) (listing circumstances [*34] in which actual facts
may rebut presumption of record title and true owner will
prevail over innocent purchaser).
Generally, the key question in this regard is whether
the transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity such
that title never left possession of the original owner, or
merely voidable in which case a bona fide purchaser may
take good title. See Brewster v. Weston, supra. Cf Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 comment a (1981).
Here, the dispute as to title revolves around the validity
of the unauthorized foreclosure sale conducted by U.S.
Bank. Certain of the amici argue that the category in
which such a transaction belongs, void or merely voidable, has not been addressed definitively in Massachusetts. Our recent decision in the case of U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 647, 941 N.E.2d 40
(2011), however, concluded that [PIN 17] "[a]ny effort to
foreclose by a party lacking 'jurisdiction and authority' to
carry out a foreclosure under [the relevant] statutes is
void." We decline the invitation to revisit this issue. In
any event, a factual prerequisite - purchase by Bevilacqua without notice of the defects in U.S. Bank's title does not exist.
Bevilacqua's petition alleges [*35] that a number of
documents were recorded with the registry, provides the
book and page number applicable to each document, but
fails to provide the dates on which recording occurred.
We take judicial notice, however, of the fact that the registry assigns book and page numbers to recorded in-

struments in a sequential manner. See Mass. G. Evid. §
201(b) (2011). We therefore may conclude that instruments with lower book and page numbers were recorded
prior to instruments with higher book and page numbers.12 Here, the book and page numbers demonstrate
recording of documents in the following order: (i) the
mortgage from Rodriguez to MERS (executed on March
18, 2005); (ii) the assignment of mortgage from MERS
to U.S. Bank (executed on July 21, 2006); (iii) the purported foreclosure deed from U.S. Bank "as Trustee" to
U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing agreement (executed on June 29, 2006); (iv) the "Confirmatory Foreclosure Deed" from U.S. Bank "as Trustee" to U.S. Bank
as trustee under the servicing agreement (executed on
October 9, 2006); and (v) the quitclaim deed from U.S.
Bank to Bevilacqua (executed on October 17, 2006). We
cannot be sure of the precise date on which the foreclosure [*36] deed became a matter of public record, but
we do know that this occurred after the assignment of
mortgage had been recorded. As a result, Bevilacqua
must have attempted to purchase the property from U.S.
Bank (in some capacity) either when the registry's
records showed the bank to be a complete stranger to
title, when the registry's records showed the bank to be
no more than an assignee of the mortgage, or when the
registry's records showed that the bank conducted the
foreclosure sale before receiving assignment of the
mortgage. In none of these circumstances could we conclude that Bevilacqua is a bona fide purchaser for value
and without notice that U.S. Bank's title was doubtful.
See Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 577, 703
N.E.2d 1149 (1998) ([HN18] parties may not "establish
themselves as bona fide purchasers simply by claiming
that they were 'blissfully unaware' o f facts to which they
closed their eyes). We therefore are unconvinced by Bevilacqua's claim to record title based on the theory that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice.
12 A registry of deeds may employ several assistant registers who process documents. It is thus
possible, although irrelevant for purposes of this
[*37] decision, that documents presented to different assistant registers at nearly the same time
may have book and page numbers that do not reflect the precise order of such overlapping presentations.
6. Dismissal with prejudice. As a final matter we
consider whether the Land Court judge properly specified that Bevilacqua's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. As discussed above, the precise procedural mechanism under which the judge decided the sua sponte
motion to dismiss is unclear. What is clear, however, is
that the judge's dismissal was based on lack of standing
and thus want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mass. R.
Civ. P. 12 (h) (3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of
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a party or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of
the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action");
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial
Court, 448 Mass. 15, 21, 858 N.E.2d 699 (2006), and
cases cited ([HN19] "The issue of standing is one of
subject matter jurisdiction").

judgment regarding that controversy. See id. at comment
a. The conclusion that Bevilacqua lacks standing to bring
a try title action is thus binding on him in future actions
but dismissal of this action for want of subject matter
jurisdiction does not bar him from bringing other actions
regarding title to the property.

[HN20] A complaint that is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits. See Mass.
R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), as amended, 454 Mass. 1403 (2009)
(involuntary dismissal or "any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, [*38] other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits"). It is thus inappropriate to attach preclusive effects
to the dismissal beyond the matter actually decided - the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § If at 108 (1982) ("A judgment
may properly be rendered against a party only if the
court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy
involved in the action"). The obvious rationale for this
rule is that a court without subject matter jurisdiction
over a controversy is without authority to issue a binding

7. Conclusion. The Land Court judge properly raised
the question whether Bevilacqua has record title to the
property such that he has standing to bring a try title action. Bevilacqua has identified no basis on which it
might be concluded that he has record title to the property [*39] such that a try title action may be sustained. As
a result, the Land Court was without jurisdiction to hear
the try title action. Dismissal of the petition was therefore proper. The dismissal should have been entered
without prejudice, however, and we therefore remand to
the Land Court for entry of judgment consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
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SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Chief Deputy

Protecting Utah • Protecting You

KIRK TORGENSEN
Chief Deputy

May 19,2011

Brian T. Moynihan
President, Bank of America
100 North Tryon St.
Charlotte, NC 28255
Re: ReconTrust Co., N.A.
Dear Mr. Moynihan:
As Attorney General for the State of Utah, I am statutorily charged with enforcing Utah's
laws in the State of Utah. In that capacity I have determined that ReconTrust, N.A., is not in
compliance with Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 when conducting real estate foreclosures in
the State of Utah.
Utah Code §§ 57-1-21(3) and 57-1-23 provide that the only valid trustees of trust deeds
with the "power of sale" are those who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title
insurance companies. Since ReconTrust is neither of these, all real estate foreclosures conducted
by ReconTrust in the State of Utah are not in compliance with Utah's statutes, and are hence
illegal.
These code sections were passed by the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2004 for the
specific purpose of protecting Utah citizens in their homes when they are faced with the potential
of a real estate foreclosure. The constitutionality of this legislation was ultimately upheld by the
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Shurtleffv. Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d 1033 (2009).
It is my understanding that ReconTrust claims that as a national bank it is exempt from
following Utah law in exercising itsfiduciarypowers. This office adamantly disagrees with that
position on the basis that the section of the National Bank Act granting national banks authority
to act in a fiduciary capacity specifically states that such authority shall be exercised only "when
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) and (b).
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Thus, ReconTrust's exercise offiduciarypowers in the State of Utah is a violation not
only of State law, but also applicable federal law.
The purpose of this letter is to give you notice that the Utah Attorney General's office
intends to enforce Utah's statutes against those conducting business in Utah, and that includes
enforcement of the real estate trustee qualification statute. I would appreciate a response to this
letterfromyou within 30 days of the date of this letter informing me of how you intend to
proceed. I am willing to discuss this issue with you or your attorneys if you like.
Sincerely,

arkLTShurtlefF
tah Attorney General
MLS/se
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